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The Devil in the Details: The Interrelationship Among 
Citizenship, Rule of Law and Form-Adhesive 
Contracts  
ZEV J. EIGEN 
Research on standard form contracts tends to focus on five areas: (1) analyzing the 
contents of common form contracts; (2) determining why competition mostly does not exist 
among firms drafting these contracts; (3) modeling consumer responses to boilerplate; (4) 
exploring judicial interpretation of these forms; and (5) discussing normatively how courts 
and laws should handle these contracts.  This Study explores empirically how individuals 
experience and interpret form-adhesive agreements, in the hope of further understanding 
how they affect exchange relationships between organizations and individuals.  This Article 
uses a measure of perceived enforceability to analyze actors’ interpretations of these 
ubiquitous agreements and explore the elusive yet historically important concepts of 
citizenship and trust in the rule of law.  To do this, this Article develops a construct, called 
“malleable consent,” as a measure of actors’ perceptions of unenforceability of form 
agreements to which they have consented without duress, fraud or coercion. 
Based on interviews with sales associates of a large national retailer and survey 
responses of MBA students of an elite university, this Article offers preliminary evidence 
that actors who regard form-adhesive agreements as binding upon them are more likely to 
regard their employment relationships as “relational” (imbued with trust, loyalty and a set 
of ethical commitments).  Conversely, actors who regard such agreements as non-binding 
are more likely to view their employment relationships as “transactional” (merely a market 
exchange).  Further, the construct, malleable consent, is used to reveal differences in 
actors’ use of law as a form of coercive power across socio-economic groups.  Preliminary 
evidence suggests that less educated, lower skilled and lower paid subjects with greater 
employment dependency are more likely to feel bound by the terms of form-adhesive 
agreements that restrict their resort to law than more educated, higher skilled, and higher 
paid subjects with less employment dependency. 
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The Devil in the Details:  The Interrelationship Among 
Citizenship, Rule of Law and Form-Adhesive 
Contracts 
ZEV J. EIGEN∗ 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
Imagine this argument made to a judge:  
Your Honor, it is true that my client signed the contract 
at issue in this case.  It is true that there was no fraud in the 
inducement, procedural unconscionability or coercion.  We 
further concede that the contract contains terms to which both 
parties consented without duress, and that no terms are 
substantively unconscionable.  Nonetheless, we submit that 
the terms contained in the contract should be viewed by this 
court as mere invitations to negotiate, as suggestions on how 
the parties should behave, and not as binding terms, in spite 
of their wording to the contrary. 
Would this lawyer be laughed out of court?  Is it not oxymoronic to 
describe a “contract’s” terms as suggestive invitations to negotiate?  What 
if instead of being made to a judge, this argument was made by one 
contracting party to the other?  Under what circumstances would this 
argument actually prevail, in spite of its clear defiance of classical, 
objective theory of contract and intuitive unfairness?  Lastly, if this way of 
viewing contracts were the norm and not the exception, what effects would 
this have, if any, on economic and social exchange, considering that by 
many accounts, our systems for both economic and social exchange are 
founded on and continue to depend on the fundamental principles of 
objective theory of contract, including consideration and meeting of the 
minds? 
These questions may seem chimerical or absurd if one imagines a 
classical contractual setting like those commonly taught in first-year law 
school classes, in which parties haggle over terms and then memorialize 
                                                                                                                          
∗ Ph.D. Candidate, Massachusetts Institute of Technology.  Please address all correspondence to 
zeveigen@mit.edu.  This research is supported in part by a grant from Harvard Law School’s Program 
on Negotiation.  I would like to thank Susan Silbey, Tom Kochan, Stewart Macaulay, Alison Morantz, 
and the participants of the MIT-IWER seminar, Harvard Law School’s PON seminar, and faculty and 
students of Wisconsin Law School in attendance when this research was presented for their helpful 
comments and suggestions. 
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them in a document called “contract.”  However, the argument presented 
above may seem less abusrd if one imagines instead, the most common 
type of contract governing exchanges between organizations and 
individuals today.  These are, of course, form-adhesive contracts.  Form-
adhesive contracts are ubiquitous.  Anyone who has received a loan, 
entered into a mortgage agreement, rented a car, purchased software, 
music, or other media, received medical care, entered into a cell phone 
service contract, gone on a cruise, signed up for a credit card, joined a club, 
or engaged in just about any other economic exchange with an 
organization in the last three decades has likely encountered many such 
agreements.  In fact, relationships between organizations and individuals 
are rooted in these take-it-or-leave-it contracts drafted by organizations (or 
more often, lawyers representing the organizations’ interests), intended to 
be signed by numerous individuals such as customers, employees, medical-
care recipients and others.  And yet, in spite of their ubiquity, form-
adhesive contracts are relatively understudied.  When they are studied, it is 
rarely from a socio-legal perspective, although the need to adopt such an 
approach has been acknowledged.1  Most of the attention paid to form 
contracts has been from an economic or legal-economic perspective, 
focused on theory and model building as opposed to empirical inquiry.  
Most existing scholarship has adopted the perspective of “society,” the 
legal system, the economy, or the drafters of form agreements.  A focus on 
individuals’ experiences with and interpretations of these contracts is much 
less common.2  Individual behavior with respect to such terms is usually 
assumed, theorized, or modeled.  It is rarely empirically observed and 
reported.   
Assumptions made about how individuals experience and interpret 
form agreements may not be accurate, and may lead to incomplete or 
inaccurate conclusions about the effects of such agreements.  As form 
agreements often dominate and define the contractual landscape in such 
important areas as mortgage lending, consumer relations, intellectual 
property licensing, and dispute resolution (in employment and consumer 
domains), it would seem like a worthwhile endeavor to empirically explore 
the effects of such contracts both within and across socio-economic strata, 
if for no other reason than to contribute to policy discussions in these areas.  
Further, as explained in more detail below, prior socio-legal research 
suggests that form-adhesive contracts may be a fruitful but relatively 
                                                                                                                          
1 Todd D. Rakoff, Commentary, The Law and Sociology of Boilerplate, 104 MICH. L. REV. 1235, 
1244–46 (2006) (discussing advantages of a judicial, rather than an administrative or legislative, 
approach to resolving issues with boilerplate contracts). 
2 One exception is Dennis P. Stolle & Andrew J. Slain, Standard Form Contracts and Contract 
Schemas: A Preliminary Investigation of the Effects of Exculpatory Clauses on Consumers’ Propensity 
to Sue, 15 BEHAV. SCI. & L. 83, 83 (1997) (presenting initial evidence that “exculpatory clauses [in 
form contracts], if read, have a deterrent effect on propensity to seek compensation”) (emphasis added). 
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untapped area in which to explore views about citizenship in the state. 
This Article seeks to fill these voids in the literature by employing 
several empirical methodologies (structured face-to-face interviews and 
surveys) to study individual social actors’ experiences with and 
interpretations of form-adhesive agreements.  In so doing, this Article 
seeks to contribute to the discussion of citizenship and the role of the rule 
of law in daily life. 
Existing research about form contracts has been framed by the 
observation that these agreements are axiomatically different from 
contracts as classically defined.  Specifically, drafting organizations 
promulgating these contracts are invariably more powerful than, and less 
dependent on, the individuals who sign them.3  There is often no “meeting 
of the minds” in the classical sense of the term, as many signers do not 
read or understand what is in the agreements they sign.  In fact, some 
organizations take great pains to craft and deliver their forms specifically 
to minimize the likelihood of such a “meeting of the minds.”4 
Scholarship has explored the nature of these differences and the 
important question of how such differences affect judicial enforcement of 
these contracts.  For instance, economists have questioned the lack of 
competition over terms contained in such contracts.5  Others have pondered 
whether these agreements are one-sided, the extent of the one-sidedness, 
and the conditions under which they are more or less one-sided.6  Still 
                                                                                                                          
3 The term “powerful” is used here in the classical, social exchange theoretical sense, essentially 
as a function of imbalanced mutual dependence.  See, e.g., JAMES COLEMAN, FOUNDATIONS OF SOCIAL 
THEORY 134–35 (1994) (diagramming the value of an individual’s power and situations where that 
power will be greatest); LINDA D. MOLM, COERCIVE POWER IN SOCIAL EXCHANGE 11–39 (1997) 
(describing basic concepts, assumptions, and principles of social exchange theory and its conception of 
power); Richard M. Emerson, Power-Dependence Relations, 27 AM. SOC. REV. 31, 31–36 (1962) (“In 
short, power resides implicitly in the other’s dependency.”); George C. Homans, Social Behavior as 
Exchange, 63 AM. J. SOC. 597, 605–06 (1958) (discussing small-group research on social structure and 
exchanges of influence). 
4 BOB SULLIVAN, GOTCHA CAPITALISM 8–10 (2007) (describing how, in 2001, AT&T 
intentionally drafted a contractual provision in which customers agreed to waive their right to sue the 
company and tailored distribution of this provision so as to minimize likelihood that it would be 
noticed or read). 
5 See, e.g., Xavaer Gabaix & David Laibson, Shrouded Attributes, Consumer Myopia, and 
Information Suppression in Competitive Markets, 121 Q. J. ECON. 505 (2006) (discussing existence of 
information “shrouding” even in competitive markets); Russell Korobkin, Bounded Rationality, 
Standard Form Contracts and Unconscionability, 70 U. CHI. L. REV. 1203 (2003) (arguing that 
because contract terms may not enter into buyers’ decision-making processes, drafting parties may 
have incentive to include inefficient contract terms in standard forms). 
6 See, e.g., Robert A. Hillman, Online Boilerplate: Would Mandatory Web Site Disclosure of e-
Standard Terms Backfire?, in BOILERPLATE: THE FOUNDATION OF MARKET CONTRACTS 83, 85 (Omri 
Ben-Shahar ed., 2007) (arguing that online disclosure might shield vendors from unconscionability 
claims, rather than increase actual readership of contract terms); Friedrich Kessler, Contracts of 
Adhesion—Some Thoughts About Freedom of Contract, 43 COLUM. L. REV. 629 (1943) (noting reasons 
behind unequal bargaining positions); Todd D. Rakoff, Contracts of Adhesion: An Essay in 
Reconstruction, 96 HARV. L. REV. 1173 (1983) (arguing that form terms contained in adhesion 
contracts should be presumptively unenforceable); W. David Slawson, Standard Form Contracts and 
Democratic Control of Lawmaking Power, 84 HARV. L. REV. 529 (1971) (proposing an analytical 
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others have contemplated when such terms are enforced by courts and 
when they ought not to be.7  Some note that boilerplate is not as bad as it 
may seem, in part because firms selectively enforce them against signers.8  
As discussed below, this last observation is perhaps the most interesting 
example of the underlying conundrum presented by form-adhesive 
agreements.  For the most part, however, those who have approached the 
subject try to ascertain what the text of these agreements purports to do, 
when they are good or bad (where “bad” means the language is one-sided 
in favor of the drafting organization), just how bad they are, how courts 
have treated such terms, and how courts should treat such terms. 
These approaches are useful and serve an important role in addressing 
policy discussions about form-adhesive agreements.  However, they 
collectively fall short of the mark when trying to understand the role of 
such contracts in exchange relationships, or more significantly in 
sustaining or undermining the rule of law.  Also, it would seem that more 
than three decades of socio-legal studies have repeatedly demonstrated the 
need to understand not only the formal “law on the books” aspect of a legal 
phenomenon such as form contracts, but the “law in action” aspect as well.  
The “law in action” approach is particularly salient in this area because, as 
noted in the literature and confirmed by the research reported herein, form 
agreements are often not even read or understood by the signers.  It would 
therefore make sense to explore interpretations of and experiences with 
form agreements (the “law in action” component) to determine how the 
law should regard these contracts, and at the very least to supplement the 
existing research, which has addressed the “law on the books” component 
almost exclusively. 
                                                                                                                          
framework in light of courts’ failure to address unfairness of one-sided consumer contracts). 
7 See, e.g., Douglas G. Baird, The Boilerplate Puzzle, 104 MICH. L. REV. 933 (2006) (arguing that 
standardized contract terms should not automatically be suspect); Michelle E. Boardman, Contra 
Proferentem: The Allure of Ambiguous Boilerplate, 104 MICH. L. REV. 1105, 1105–06 (2006) 
(“Drafters value boilerplate because the courts know what it means.”); Robert A. Hillman & Jeffrey J. 
Rachlinksi, Standard-Form Contracting in the Electronic Age, 77 NYU L. REV. 429 (2002) 
(concluding that current framework used by courts for dealing with form contracts will be sufficient to 
apply to the Internet world); Florencia Marotta-Wurgler, What’s in a Standard Form Contract?  An 
Empirical Analysis of Software License Agreements, 4 J. EMP. LEG. STUD. 677 (2007) (finding that 
licenses tend to be biased in favor of software companies, and that the larger or younger a company, the 
more one-sided the contract); Slawson, supra note 6, at 532 (“It would be equally unrealistic to confer 
on courts broad powers to rewrite [form-adhesive agreements].”). 
8 See, e.g., Florencia Marotta-Wurgler, “Unfair” Dispute Resolution Clauses: Much Ado About 
Nothing?, in BOILERPLATE THE FOUNDATION OF MARKET CONTRACTS 45, 46–66 (Omri Ben-Shahar 
ed., 2007) (applying an empirical study of dispute resolution clauses to find that such clauses do not 
place hardships upon consumers); Lucian A. Bebchuk & Richard A. Posner, One-Sided Contracts in 
Competitive Consumer Markets, 104 MICH. L. REV. 827, 828 (2006) (noting that a company’s 
“expectation of doing business with other consumers in the future may dissuade it from enforcing a 
one-sided contract to the hilt”); Jason Scott Johnston, The Return of Bargain: An Economic Theory of 
How Standard-Form Contracts Enable Cooperative Negotiation Between Businesses and Consumers, 
104 MICH. L. REV. 857, 858 (2006) (“[F]irms . . . have given their managerial employees the discretion 
to grant exceptions from the standard-form terms on a case-by-case basis.”).  
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It may occur to those steeped in the law and society tradition—
particularly those of the legal realist persuasion and even more particularly 
those familiar with the seminal work of Stewart Macaulay,9 Grant 
Gilmore10 and Lawrence M. Friedman11—that such a focus on the citizen is 
essential to fully understand these unusual forms of contract as 
experienced.  Contract as experienced, as Macaulay and others would 
likely agree, is often more important than contract as written.  In fact, the 
necessity of including empirical analysis of individuals’ experiences and 
interpretations of contracts is evidenced by the central finding of 
Macaulay’s important work on contracts among businessmen: individual 
opinions about contracts more saliently predict how breaches are perceived 
and resolved than the contract terms themselves.12  This research seeks to 
extend the work of Macaulay and others by examining how individuals 
actually experience form agreements, and how individual interpretations of 
form agreements affect the way in which social actors exchange 
(contractually or otherwise) with the organizations that require their 
consent on such forms. 
The objectives for this analysis are threefold.  First, this Article argues 
that through an exploration of individual interpretations of and experiences 
with form-adhesive agreements, it is possible to gain a fuller understanding 
of trust in the rule of law and by extension, citizenship in the state.  
Second, this Article seeks to contribute to the important discussion among 
contract scholars about how form agreements ought to be regarded in 
doctrine and legislation by demonstrating empirically the connection 
between interpretations of form-adhesive agreements and how individuals 
regard their ongoing relationships with form-drafting organizations.  Third, 
in challenging the assumption of uniformity in individual interpretation of 
form agreements, this Article argues that observed differences of 
interpretations of and experiences with boilerplate vary with socio-
economic status (SES), such that higher SES actors view the enforceability 
of contracts they have signed as more malleable than lower SES actors.  
The implications of such SES-based differences of interpretation of form 
agreements for theories of democracy and the liberal state may be far-
                                                                                                                          
9 See generally Stewart Macaulay, An Empirical View of Contract, 1985 WIS. L. REV. 465 (1985) 
(reflecting on his 1963 article and updating his theory); Stewart Macaulay, Non-Contractual Relations 
in Business: A Preliminary Study, 28 AM. SOC. REV. 55 (1963) [hereinafter Macaulay, Non-
Contractual Relations] (noting that, in the business world, planning of exchange relations and use of 
legal sanctions to settle disputes are seen as unnecessary and undesirable). 
10 See, e.g., GRANT GILMORE, THE DEATH OF CONTRACT 87 (1974) (“[W]e might say that what is 
happening is that ‘contract’ is being reabsorbed into the mainstream of ‘tort.’”).  
11 See generally LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, CONTRACT LAW IN AMERICA: A SOCIAL AND 
ECONOMIC CASE STUDY (1965) (studying relations between and changes in contract law and society in 
Wisconsin from the Civil War through the 1950s). 
12 Macaulay, Non-Contractual Relations, supra note 9, at 55 (directly and succinctly introducing 
the article by asking, “What good is contract law?  Who uses it?  When and how?”). 
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reaching considering the degree to which citizens’ consumer and 
employment relations are governed by these contracts. 
In sum, this Article attempts to elaborate on our understanding of 
citizenship through perceptions of contract.  This is not at odds with prior 
research on boilerplate.  In fact, it is an extension of existing research in 
mostly uncharted directions.  However, in so doing, this Article challenges 
several critical assumptions made by existing scholarship about the 
uniformity of perceived enforceability of form agreements. 
To illustrate the importance of actor-centered empirical inquiry, 
consider the arguments advanced by Lucian Bebchuk and Richard Posner 
in one article13 and Jason Scott Johnston in another.14  These authors claim 
that firms do not intend to strictly enforce the terms contained in form 
agreements.15  That is, firms keep self-serving terms in form contracts to 
selectively “fend off consumer opportunism,” as Omri Ben-Shahar 
describes it, but otherwise allow honest clients off the hook.16  These 
authors assume a uniformity of individual interpretation of the form 
agreements they have signed.  All actors, they argue, are assumed to 
behave consistently with their interests—when the terms are activated and 
not in their interests, individuals will speak up and demand 
circumnavigation from the organizations, otherwise honest clients remain 
silent.  Firms then sort the honest from the dishonest and enforce only 
against the latter, resulting in a presumptively fair outcome.  Johnston goes 
so far as to argue that boilerplate encourages negotiation, like the lawyer’s 
hypothetical argument at the outset of this Article, suggesting that the 
terms contained in such agreements to which both sides have ostensibly 
bound themselves are merely invitations to negotiate.17  This may be the 
organizations’ view, and this Article later addresses how this approach 
parallels the way in which powerful, ruling-class elite social actors 
historically transformed statutory law to conform to their interests.  But 
this assumption conflates the notion of self-interest, on the one hand, with 
perceptions of one’s ability to rely on the law to enforce a contract or to 
wield the law as a sword to escape from a contractual provision that 
appears unlawful on the other.  This Article argues that these things are 
quite separate, and need to be measured separately, especially when the 
exchange relationship of interest is axiomatically power-imbalanced as is 
                                                                                                                          
13 Bebchuk & Posner, supra note 8. 
14 Johnston, supra note 8. 
15 Bebchuk & Posner, supra note 8, at 827–28; Johnston, supra note 8, at 858. 
16 BOILERPLATE: THE FOUNDATION OF MARKET CONTRACTS, at xi (Omri Ben-Shahar ed., 2007). 
17 See Johnston, supra note 8, at 864–77 (citing examples of standard-form contracts in which 
negotiating over terms with consumers is an accepted and expected business practice); Joel Rothstein 
Wolfson, Contract and Copyright Are Not at War: A Reply to “The Metamorphosis of Contract into 
Expand,” 87 CAL. L. REV. 79, 95 (1999) (“As corporate counsel for a large corporation, I can tell you 
that very few terms in a contract are truly ‘non-negotiable.’”). 
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the case with form-adhesive contracts. 
What if all individual signers do not view these contracts they have 
signed in this unusual way—as invitations to negotiate?18  Form 
agreements are, after all, binding legal contracts (at least they may appear 
as such to some).  What if some regard form contracts “myopically,” 
thinking that there is no post-agreement negotiation available, and others 
regard them, perhaps more sophisticatedly, as open and quite negotiable, 
like the “myopes” and “sophisticated consumers” in Xavaer Gabaix and 
David Laibson’s terms?19  This is exactly the type of division that prior 
research on law as a differentiated resource suggests.  Along these lines, 
what if the variation in individual interpretations is such that the 
organizations’ opportunities for sorting are not aligned to distinguish 
opportunism from altruism?  What if SES differences among individuals 
explain part of the variation, such that lower SES actors are more likely to 
feel bound by one-sided terms than higher SES actors?  Again, this is 
consistent with prior scholarship on citizenship. 
The purpose of this Article is to raise questions, provoke discussion 
and begin to empirically vet the theories developed about perceived 
enforceability of contract.  It is also the aim of this Article to expand the 
scope of inquiry on the phenomenon of form contracts beyond the present 
range of disciplines.  Hopefully, this Article illustrates the need for further 
empirical study of citizens’ engagement with these ubiquitous contracts.   
To begin, this Article examines these questions: What happens to 
interpretations of enforceability when actors bind themselves to contracts 
that they have had no opportunity to participate in negotiating or drafting?  
Does variation exist in interpretations of enforceability of such 
agreements?  What effect(s), if any, does such variation have on the way 
individuals interpret their exchanges with the entities (mostly institutions) 
that draft such agreements?  Do groups of socio-economic actors interpret 
enforceability of agreements differently and with what effect, if any? 
To address these questions, a construct called “malleable consent” is 
introduced, which is the view that an agreement to which one has 
consented without duress or fraud is nonetheless not enforceable against 
the signer in whole or in relevant part.  Part II traces the theory underlying 
the interrelationship among interpretations of contract, trust in the rule of 
law and citizenship in the state.  This Part also outlines malleable consent’s 
theoretical utility as an indicator of trust in the rule of law.  Malleable 
consent is presented as a means of studying how individuals construe and 
                                                                                                                          
18 Interestingly, there is research demonstrating gender differences in the way in which 
individuals perceive opportunities to initiate negotiations.  See generally LINDA BABCOCK & SARA 
LASCHEVER, WOMEN DON'T ASK: NEGOTIATION AND THE GENDER DIVIDE (2003) (exploring gender 
gap in propensity to initiate negotiations). 
19 Gabaix & Laibson, supra note 5, at 507–09. 
 390 CONNECTICUT LAW REVIEW [Vol. 41:381 
respond to form agreements, and as a way of examining popular faith in 
the rule of law. 
Part III explains the two questions motivating the research 
methodology and findings.  First, how does malleable consent vary across 
SES?  Second, what is the relationship, if any, between malleable consent 
and how individuals exchange with their employers: as a transaction 
devoid of trust and loyalty, or as an ongoing relationship?  Part IV details 
the two studies in which malleable consent was observed.   
The main analysis is in Part V, which sets out the preliminary findings 
supporting the hypothesis that higher SES actors are more likely to regard 
form-adhesive agreements as unenforceable when compared to lower SES 
actors.  Part VI then discusses the findings in support of the hypothesis that 
actors are more likely to regard form agreements as unenforceable (high 
malleable consent) when they view their jobs as instrumental 
transactions—as simply a financial exchange.  Where employment is 
regarded as an exchange of obligations as well as rewards, as imbued with 
a substantive, moral relationship—what industrial relations scholars often 
refer to as a “social contract” or a “relational exchange”20—actors are more 
likely to regard the form-adhesive agreements as enforceable (low 
malleable consent).  Essentially, when actors view form-adhesive 
agreements as unenforceable, there is less expressed trust in the 
employment relationship.  These results seem to hold across diverse 
populations, from low level employees of a national company to MBA 
students at an elite business school.  MBA students, who enjoy less 
dependent employment constraints (for example, more job opportunities 
and less dependencies), voice less respect for the enforceability of the 
contracts they sign.  They display malleable consent more frequently than 
sales associates with greater employment dependency and constraints.  
Exploring these differences across the two divergent groups, the construct 
is presented as a means of revealing otherwise unobserved differences 
among citizens’ interpretations of law in the employment context.  Part VI 
discusses the implications of this research and Part VII the limitations.  
The conclusion follows. 
                                                                                                                          
20 THOMAS KOCHAN & BETH SHULMAN, ECON. POLICY INST., A NEW SOCIAL CONTRACT: 
RESTORING DIGNITY AND BALANCE TO THE ECONOMY 1 (2007); Thomas Kochan, Presidential Address 
to the 52nd Annual Meeting of the Industrial Relations Research Association: Building a New Social 
Contract at Work: A Call to Action, 3 (January 7–9, 2000), available at http://www.press.uillinois.edu/ 
journals/irra/IRRA_Proceedings_2000.pdf#page=12.  See generally PAUL OSTERMAN ET AL., 
WORKING IN AMERICA: A BLUEPRINT FOR THE NEW LABOR MARKET (2001) (discussing the difficulty 
American industry faces in meeting social obligations to workers in a modern economy). 
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II.  THE INTERRELATIONSHIP AMONG CITIZENSHIP, CONTRACT AND TRUST 
IN THE RULE OF LAW 
There is a connection between interpretations of law and virtually all 
social and economic exchange.  By understanding such interpretations, we 
may gain a fuller understanding of the circumstances under which 
individuals rely on the law, avoid the law, break the law and believe in the 
consequences of actions that deviate from the law.21  This connection is 
important because, in part, it defines citizenship in the state.  Work by 
sociologists and other scholars has repeatedly and consistently 
demonstrated this connection.22  Trust in agreements underlies not only 
economic transactions but also lies at the heart of the civil justice system, 
the rule of law more generally, and, to a larger extent, our ability to interact 
socially.  The notion that parties to an exchange may bind themselves 
presently, and often rely on their agreements in the future, is 
simultaneously at the root of all commerce and all social interaction.  
Understanding this relationship is important because deterioration of the 
critical mass of contract-enforceability believers yields a corresponding 
                                                                                                                          
21 See generally PATRICIA EWICK & SUSAN S. SILBEY, THE COMMON PLACE OF LAW: STORIES 
FROM EVERYDAY LIFE (1998) (examining anecdotally ways in which Americans’ lives are influenced 
by the way they think about and use the law); Patricia Ewick & Susan Silbey, Narrating Social 
Structure: Stories of Resistance to Legal Authority, 6 AM. J. SOC. 1328, 1329 (2003) (arguing that 
“resistance [to law] is enabled and collectivized . . . by the circulation of stories narrating moments 
when taken for granted social structure is exposed and the usual direction of constraint upended”); Kent 
Greenawalt, The Natural Duty to Obey the Law, 84 MICH. L. REV. 1, 2 (1985) (examining “natural 
duty” to explain why people “have a moral obligation or duty to obey the law”); Susan S. Silbey & 
Austin Sarat, Critical Traditions in Law and Society Research, 21 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 165, 165 (1987) 
(“Legal institutions cannot be understood without seeing the entire social environment.”). 
22 See, e.g., KRISTIN BUMILLER, THE CIVIL RIGHTS SOCIETY: THE SOCIAL CONSTRUCTION OF 
VICTIMS 1 (1988) (“challeng[ing] the conventional faith in the law’s ability to eradicate social 
prejudice”); JAMES S. COLEMAN, FOUNDATIONS OF SOCIAL THEORY (1990) (concerning behavior of 
social systems); EWICK & SILBEY, supra note 21, at xi (“us[ing] stories of everyday life to discover the 
different ways in which people use and think about law”); IN LITIGATION: DO THE “HAVES” STILL 
COME OUT AHEAD? (Herbert M. Kritzer & Susan S. Silbey eds., 2003) (discussing how social changes 
have affected Marc Galanter’s Why the “Haves” Come Out Ahead article and theory); JUSTICE AND 
POWER IN SOCIOLEGAL STUDIES 1 (Bryant G. Garth & Austin Sarat eds., 1998) (“connect[ing] an 
understanding of culture’s normative ideals with examination of the complex ways that law works in 
the world”); SALLY ENGLE MERRY, GETTING JUSTICE AND GETTING EVEN: LEGAL CONSCIOUSNESS 
AMONG WORKING-CLASS AMERICANS (1990) (addressing use of court system to settle personal 
disputes); TOM R. TYLER, WHY PEOPLE OBEY THE LAW (2006) (“[E]xplor[ing] the everyday behavior 
of citizens toward the law and examin[ing] why people obey or disobey it.”); Robert J. Bies & Tom R. 
Tyler, The “Litigation Mentality” in Organizations: A Test of Alternative Psychological Explanations, 
4 ORG. SCI. 352, 352 (1993) (“identify[ing] different psychological factors that could explain why 
employees consider suing their employers”); Lauren B. Edelman & Mark C. Suchman, When the 
“Haves” Hold Court: Speculations on the Organizational Internalization of Law, 33 LAW & SOC’Y 
REV. 941, 941 (1999) (“extend[ing] Galanter’s analysis by considering the ability of large bureaucratic 
organizations to ‘internalize’ legal rules, structures, personnel, and activities”); Marc Galanter, Why the 
“Haves” Come Out Ahead, 9 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 95 (1974) (addressing different interactions with 
legal system between “one-shotters” and “repeat-players”); James L. Gibson, Institutional Legitimacy, 
Procedural Justice, and Compliance with Supreme Court Decisions: A Question of Causality, 25 LAW 
& SOC’Y REV. 631, 632 (1991) (arguing that “those who perceive the Court as more procedurally fair 
are no more or no less likely to acquiese to unpopular Court decisions”). 
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problematic deterioration of law, associated with loss of social control and 
increased resort to non-legal means of redress, including violence, asocial 
behavior and other potentially undesirable outcomes.23   
This connection between citizenship and the rule of law on one hand 
and beliefs about enforceability of contract on the other is discussed 
specifically by several notable scholars.  For instance, Eugen Ehrlich wrote 
that the contract is the “juristic form for the distribution . . . of the goods 
and personal abilities (services) that are in existence in society.”24  The law 
embodies the norms of exchange in this “contract.”  Actors interpret and 
often reinterpret contracts they have created (or at least to which they have 
consented).  Actors’ interpretations of their contracts are colored by their 
views of the law specifically, in context with respect to the relative power 
of the parties, and generally, often drawing on notions of justice, equity 
and fairness.25  Thus, a self-perpetuating loop that enables both economic 
and social exchange to function is born.  Max Weber and others after him 
agree that contract creates law as much as law creates contract.26  This is 
why, for example, the Uniform Commercial Code (UCC) attempts to 
embody and defer to industry custom (the norms of exchange), and why 
those creating contracts governed by the UCC look to case law interpreting 
it and related statutes in negotiating their instruments of exchange. 
The proposition that our collective belief in the enforceability of 
contracts is necessary for the law to remain self-sustaining is not novel.  
On the contrary, the idea of the embeddedness of the state, and hence, the 
law, in all seemingly private contracts is, in fact, rather old.  Emile 
Durkheim explained that there are no private contracts—even in 
agreements between private parties where no explicit reference to the state 
or the law is made: 
It is true that obligations that are properly contractual can 
be entered into or abrogated by the mere will to agreement of 
the parties.  Yet we must bear in mind that, if a contract has 
binding force, it is society which confers that force.  Let us 
                                                                                                                          
23 See generally DONALD BLACK, THE BEHAVIOR OF LAW (1976) (discussing law as one form of 
social control); EUGEN EHRLICH, FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLES OF THE SOCIOLOGY OF LAW (1936) 
(discussing relationship between legal decisions and society); Donald Black, Crime as Social Control, 
48 AM. SOC. REV. 34, 34 (1983) (“examin[ing] . . . the so-called struggle between law and self-help”). 
24 EHRLICH, supra note 23, at 48. 
25 Tom R. Tyler, The Psychology of Legitimacy: A Relational Perspective on Voluntary Deference 
to Authorities, 1 PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCH. REV. 323, 336–38 (1997); see, e.g., James L. Gibson, 
Understandings of Justice: Institutional Legitimacy, Procedural Justice, and Political Tolerance, 23 
LAW & SOC’Y REV. 469, 474–90 (1989) (exploring connections between perceptions of procedural 
fairness and conceptions of just decision making); Craig A. McEwen & Richard J. Maiman, In Search 
of Legitimacy: Toward an Empirical Analysis, 8 LAW & POL’Y 257, 257 (1986) (“conclud[ing] that 
institutional legitimacy is related to voluntary compliance”). 
26 MAX WEBER, MAX WEBER ON LAW IN ECONOMY AND SOCIETY 125 (Max Rheinstein ed., 
Edward Shils & Max Rheinstein trans., 1954). 
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assume that it does not give its blessing to the obligations that 
have been contracted; these then become pure promises 
possessing only moral authority.  Every contract therefore 
assumes behind the parties who bind each other, society is 
there, quite prepared to intervene and to enforce respect for 
any undertakings entered into.  Thus it only bestows this 
obligatory force upon contracts that have a social value in 
themselves, that is, those that are in conformity with the rules 
of law.  We shall even occasionally see that its intervention is 
still more positive.  It is therefore present in every 
relationship determined by restitutory law, even in ones that 
appear the most completely private, and its presence, 
although not felt, at least under normal conditions, is no less 
essential.27  
It follows from the above proposition that belief in the enforceability 
of contracts is at least, in part, a reflection of belief in the state’s ability to 
enforce law generally.  Ehrlich agreed with Durkheim on this point and 
took the concept one step further.  Ehrlich believed not only that the law 
and the state lurk in the shadows of all private contracts, but that informal, 
everyday norms of social exchange do as well.28  He noted that even in 
commercial dealings, contracts are not entered into as with definite 
persons, “but as with the whole group of persons who are in a mutual 
relation of exchange of goods with each other.”29  This idea that 
contractual relations norms extend beyond the four corners of private 
parties’ agreements to affect the scope of others’ legal power is echoed in 
Weber’s writings as well: 
In certain situations the normative control through 
enabling rules necessarily extends beyond the task of the 
mere delimitation of the range of the parties’ individual 
spheres of freedom.  As a general rule, the permitted legal 
transactions include a power of the parties to the transaction 
to affect even third parties.  In some sense and to some 
degree almost every legal transaction between two persons,  
inasmuch as it modifies the mode of the distribution of 
disposition over legally guaranteed powers of control, affects 
relations with an indeterminately large body of outsiders.30 
Taken together, the ideas of Ehrlich, Durkheim and Weber yield the 
                                                                                                                          
27 EMILE DURKHEIM, THE DIVISION OF LABOR IN SOCIETY 71 (W.D. Halls trans., The Free Press 
1984) (emphasis added).  
28 EHRLICH, supra note 23, at 45–48. 
29 Id. at 46. 
30 WEBER, supra note 26, at 126. 
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feedback loop described above wherein law relies on norms of social 
exchange, which in turn rely on law to sustain the social order generally.  
Thus, the normative context of exchange, the social valences associated 
with the provisions of agreements, and perceptions of law are all part of 
this critical exchange relationship in which emergent contracts are the legal 
representation of the interaction.  This notion is encapsulated in Abram 
Chayes’s influential work, The Modern Corporation and the Rule of Law,31 
in social theoretical insights of how each person makes the law when he or 
she writes a contract, and in the idea that the law is not about proscriptions, 
but about individually crafted prescriptions.32  Because the way that parties 
to a contract interpret their agreements has the capacity to affect the law, 
the “disposition over legally guaranteed powers of control,”33 and a host of 
other socially relevant measures, trust or faith in the enforceability of 
contract is required for the feedback loop to be perpetuated. 
The feedback loop—involving norms of exchange, interpretation of 
law, law “on the books” and contract—begs the question of which element 
is in control of the loop.  Macaulay demonstrated that terms contained in 
negotiated, arms-length business contracts among sophisticated and 
knowledgeable actors are often eclipsed by the norms of interaction.34  
These actors’ interpretations of how business is to be conducted dictated 
how they behaved more so than the written terms in contracts they had 
entered.35  Available contractual remedies were foregone, and extra-
contractual responses, including penalties for breach, were negotiated and 
accepted in spite of pre-existing written agreements purporting to dictate 
otherwise.36  These observations lead to the provocative Realist assertion 
that “contract is dead.”37  However, this assertion, and the associated 
scholarship, do not begin to fully explain the effects of this alleged death 
on the contracting actors, and the conditions under which these important 
norms and interpretations vary systematically.  This research seeks to pick 
up this very set of questions. 
                                                                                                                          
31 ABRAM CHAYES, THE MODERN CORPORATION AND THE RULE OF LAW 25, 32 (Edward S. 
Mason ed., 1959). 
32 See LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN & STEWART MACAULAY, LAW AND THE BEHAVIORAL SCIENCES 
577–78 (2d ed. 1977) (“[T]he source of law is said to lie in the will of the people. . . . [T]he structure of 
the legal system itself—the way in which ‘custom’ or ‘public opinion’ is translated into ‘law’—is itself 
an important factor . . . .”). 
33 See supra text accompanying note 30. 
34 Macaulay, Non-Contractual Relations, supra note 9, at 59–62. 
35 Id. at 60; see GILMORE, supra note 10, at 64–65, 70–71 (explaining that law of contract has 
evolved to accommodate expectations of parties); see generally FRIEDMAN, supra note 11 (noting that 
contract law changes along with society). 
36 Macaulay, Non-Contractual Relations, supra note 9, at 61–62. 
37 GILMORE, supra note 10, at 1; Robert A. Hillman, The Crisis in Modern Contract Theory, 67 
TEX. L. REV. 103, 113–15 (1988). 
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A.  Variation in Malleable Consent 
Depending on one’s theoretical assumptions, it could be either 
expected or quite counter-intuitive that actors vary in the way they 
construe the enforceability of agreements into which they have entered.  It 
may be expected for those who posit that law is a differentiated resource.38  
If form-adhesive agreements are interpreted and experienced in the same 
way that other legal things are, it follows that variation exists here as it 
does in contexts like the civil and criminal justice systems.39  Some could 
view contract, regardless of its adhesiveness or form-ness, as a set of moral 
obligations.  In this instance, the morality of the agreement drives the 
perceived enforceability and trumps other concerns like fairness, 
instrumental cost-benefit calculations, or even legality.  However, it is just 
as easy to imagine how a different configuration of priorities could lead to 
regarding the same form contract as unenforceable.  Variation may 
therefore also be expected for those who subscribe to the view of contract 
as an embodiment of moral obligations, where one person’s morality may 
differ greatly from her contractual counterpart’s.40  For some, a “deal’s a 
deal” trumps “it’s not fair that I was forced to sign the waiver in order to 
receive emergency medical treatment for my daughter.”  Lastly, it may be 
the case that variation in perceived enforceability is expected for those who 
believe that resource-dependency dominates the decision-making process.  
For instance, if one has to sign a contract in order to receive the benefit of 
the bargain, one should be acutely aware of one’s true resource-
dependence on the party requiring their signature.  It would be rational and 
expected to assume that a party who is able to force one to sign a contract 
is also quite capable of enforcing its terms. 
Variation in perceived enforceability is counter-intuitive for those who 
assert that action is consistently, and almost uniformly, rationally self-
interested, as is often the case in economic models of behavior.  In such 
models, people sign because it is in their interests.  They prefer to receive 
                                                                                                                          
38 See, e.g., EWICK & SILBEY, supra note 21, at 17; Kritzer & Silbey, supra note 22, at 8 (noting 
that “repeat players . . . are much more likely to win [in court] than one-shot litigants”); PHILIPPE 
NONET & PHILIP SELZNICK, LAW AND SOCIETY IN TRANSITION: TOWARD RESPONSIVE LAW 9 (1978) 
(“[A] legal order has many dimensions . . . .”). 
39 See, e.g., Robert M. Cover, Violence and the Word, 95 YALE L.J. 1601, 1617 (1986) (“Legal 
interpretation, therefore, can never be ‘free;’ it can never be the function of an understanding of the text 
or word alone.”); Kritzer & Silbey, supra note 22, at 4 (noting that one-shot litigants are disadvantaged 
in other civil and criminal contexts); Sally Falk Moore, Law and Social Change: The Semi-Autonomous 
Social Field as an Appropriate Subject of Study, 7 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 719, 719 (1973) (“The complex 
‘law,’ thus condensed into one term, is abstracted from the social context in which it exists, and is 
spoken of as if it were an entity capable of controlling that context.”); C. Wesley Younts & Charles W. 
Mueller, Justice Processes: Specifying the Mediating Role of Perceptions of Distributive Justice, 66 
AMER. SOC. REV. 125, 125 (2001) (“Justice is a rather murky concept in social psychology, perhaps 
because of its various uses in common discourse.”). 
40 See, e.g., Randy E. Barnett, A Consent Theory of Contract, 86 COLUM. L. REV. 269, 296–300 
(1986) (articulating theories of contracts in which one’s morals inform one’s contractual obligations).  
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the benefit of the bargain and incur the costs of signing the agreement, 
because the benefits less the costs are assumedly preferred to incurring the 
opportunity cost of foregoing the benefit of the bargain.  In the 
employment context, new hires are in a honeymoon period and could not 
imagine having to sue their employers for being illegally fired or harassed.  
They therefore view the costs of signing away their right to sue their new 
employers in court as either extremely low or nonexistent.  Why not give 
away a right if the likelihood of needing it is so low?  Down the road, 
when signers want to do something the terms of the agreement prohibit, 
actors are assumed to regard the contract as unenforceable, proportional 
with their expected utility of seeking escape from the contract less the 
perceived costs of seeking escape.  This is most often the case in economic 
analyses of behavior around contract.41 
Similarly, those who study law with regard to norms of exchange often 
laud the law as supporting shared, uniform and socially accepted 
institutional rules as a reflection of public opinion.42  For instance, Jürgen 
Habermas notes that the law allows actors to relate to each other as agents 
predictably because of a shared understanding of legal obligation and 
responsibility, thereby removing a heavy organizational burden from 
communicative skills.43  Variability of subjective contractual enforceability 
yields less predictability and increased social discord.  This Article offers 
evidence of this lack of uniformity, contending that actors vary in the 
degree to which they regard the enforceability of terms, even when the 
terms are constant and against their interests. 
B.  The Relationship Between Form-Adhesive Agreements and Malleable 
Consent 
Form-adhesive agreements are not new.  In fact, writing in 1936, 
Ehrlich observed that “[m]ost written contracts are drawn up according to 
printed forms, the content of which often is not made known to the parties, 
for it is determined by society quite independently of their individual 
wills.”44  Form agreements were and continue to be justified byproducts of 
                                                                                                                          
41 See, e.g., Keith N. Hylton, Agreements to Waive or to Arbitrate Legal Claims: An Economic 
Analysis, 8 SUP. CT. ECON. REV. 209, 213–14 (2000) (explaining economic reasons for why parties 
would choose to enter waiver agreements); see also Steven E. Plaut, Implicit Contracts in the Absence 
of Enforcement, 76 AMER. ECON. REV. 257, 257–58 (1986) (explaining economics behind 
enforceability of implicit contracts). 
42 See W. FRIEDMANN, LAW IN A CHANGING SOCIETY 6, 10, 99 (1959) (“In a democracy, the 
interplay between social opinion and the law-moulding activities of the State is a more obvious and 
articulate one.”); JÜRGEN HABERMAS, 2 THE THEORY OF COMMUNICATIVE ACTION 365–66 (Thomas 
McCarthy trans., 1987) (discussing social context in which laws are enacted). 
43 See HABERMAS, supra note 42, at 365 (“This is true of cases where the law serves as a means 
for organizing media-controlled subsystems that have, in any case, become autonomous in relation to 
the normative contexts of action oriented by mutual understanding.”). 
44 EHRLICH, supra note 23, at 49. 
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a bureaucratic, industrialized society.  Many judges and scholars initially 
viewed such forms as innocuous conveniences—as the way to lubricate 
economic exchange given the unavoidable impersonal nature of daily 
interactions.  As Weber noted, “forms are necessary only to the extent that 
they are prescribed for reasons of expediency, especially for the sake of the 
unambiguous demonstrability of rights, and thus of legal security.”45  He 
believed, however, that the expanse of their use would be determined by 
property rights and power.  In fact, he theorized that the very tenet of 
“contractual freedom,” and courts’ desire to avoid substantive analysis of 
“fair deals,” would result in institutionally legitimated and routinized 
power by the few over others.46 
The nascent evolution of the notion of malleable consent is traceable 
even in court opinions in which boilerplate was sought to be enforced.  In 
1960, the Supreme Court of New Jersey heard the case of Henningsen v. 
Bloomfield Motors, Inc. in which a car buyer sued the automobile 
manufacturer for consequential damages allegedly resulting from a 
defective steering mechanism.47   The car maker argued that the buyer 
waived his right to sue for such damages when he signed the contract 
containing a waiver of damages clause in the fine print.48  The court ruled 
that the waiver did not apply:   
The traditional contract is the result of free bargaining of 
parties who are brought together by the play of the market, 
and who meet each other on a footing of approximate 
economic equality.  In such a society there is no danger that 
freedom of contract will be a threat to the social order as a 
whole.  But in present-day commercial life the standardized 
mass contract has appeared.  It is used primarily by 
enterprises with strong bargaining power and position.49 
The court’s implied and uncanny prediction that the rise of the form-
adhesive agreement would upset the “social order as a whole” is 
particularly emblematic of one of this Article’s propositions about the 
scope and effect of this research.  Specifically, this Article speculates that 
the more we enter into form-adhesive agreements, the more our collective 
notion of contract becomes watered-down.  With the degradation of this 
bedrock on which our economic system is based, this Article forecasts 
major instability in industries predicated on boilerplate contracts, like the 
                                                                                                                          
45 WEBER, supra note 26, at 125. 
46 See id. at 189 (“The result of contractual freedom, then, is in the first place the opening of the 
opportunity to use, by the clever utilization of property ownership in the market, these resources 
without legal restraints as a means for the achievement of power over others.”). 
47 Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors, Inc., 161 A.2d 69, 73, 75 (N.J. 1960).  
48 Id. at 84. 
49 Id. at 86. 
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mortgage lending industry.  Form mortgages are the norm, and because 
people have numbed to contracts that appear similar and innocuous, this 
Article speculates that many sign these agreements with greater malleable 
consent than they should have for such contracts.  A mortgage form may 
look like the same form legalese as the “Terms & Conditions” that a cell-
phone service provider sends to its customers in the mail, but they are not.  
Greater perceived unenforceability on a mass scale can have dire economic 
consequences if and when the drafting organizations seek enforcement of 
terms that individual signers regarded incorrectly as mere invitations to 
negotiate just as individuals might with more innocuous form agreements 
like the cell-phone service Terms & Conditions or other commonly 
encountered forms.  The greater the societal level of malleable consent, the 
less trust there is in the rule of law.  Less trust in the rule of law yields 
increased resort to non-institutional, extra-legal forms of coercive power 
and other negative outcomes.50   
Lastly, it is worth noting two additional notions that may be applicable 
when addressing individual behavior around form adhesive agreements.  
The first comes from the literature on the phenomenon known as 
“escalation of commitment.”51  Part of this research has demonstrated that 
the less often or less actively actors participate in a negotiation process, the 
less buy-in the actors feel to the terms of the agreement.52  It follows that 
actors who do not participate at all in the process of creating an agreement 
have no control over the terms or the process by which the parties bind 
themselves (this is the definition of form-adhesive agreements).  In most 
cases, these actors have no personal connection with the party that created 
the agreement, and are more likely not to accept the agreement as 
compared to actors for whom such conditions do not exist.  It is possible 
then, that such micro-level experiences also yield greater collective belief 
                                                                                                                          
50 This logical progression is somewhat analogous to arguments about other pervasive social 
phenomena in that it is easy to believe but hard to prove.  For instance, it may be easy to believe that 
pervasive depictions of violence in music, television, video games and on the Internet has some 
deleterious impact on social action.  This notion, however, is difficult to prove, in part because of the 
extent to which the phenomenon exists. 
51 See, e.g., Joel Brockner, The Escalation of Commitment to a Failing Course of Action: Toward 
Theoretical Progress, 17 ACAD. MGMT. REV. 39, 39–42 (1992) (reviewing development of theory); 
Barry M. Staw, The Escalation of Commitment to a Course of Action, 6 ACAD. MGMT. REV. 577, 577–
80 (1981) (“[M]any of the most injurious personal decisions and most glaring policy disasters can come 
in the shape of sequential and escalating commitments.”). 
52 See ROGER FISHER ET AL., GETTING TO YES: NEGOTIATING AGREEMENT WITHOUT GIVING IN 
27–28 (Bruce Patton ed., 1991) (“Give them a stake in the outcome by making sure they participate in 
the process.  If they are not involved in the process, they are hardly likely to approve the product.”); 
RICHARD E. WALTON & ROBERT B. MCKERSIE, A BEHAVIORAL THEORY OF LABOR NEGOTIATIONS 
149–50 (1965) (explaining the importance of alerting opposing party of your intentions before entering 
negotiations); D. Ramona Bobocel & John P. Meyer, Escalating Commitment to a Failing Course of 
Action: Separating the Roles of Choice and Justification, 79 J. APPLIED PSYCHOL. 360, 360–61 (1994) 
(noting prior scholars’ confusion of personal responsibility and public justification in escalation of 
commitment studies). 
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that such agreements are unenforceable against them. 
A second notion comes from an observation frequently noted in the 
legal scholarship on boilerplate.  People tend not to read the form-adhesive 
agreements they sign.  As many argue, this is rational behavior for a 
number of reasons.53  If subjects do not read the terms at the time of 
consent, they would have no opportunity to know (or care) whether the 
provisions are enforceable against them.  Later, when they learn that the 
terms exist, they can either accept that the entity that coerced them to sign 
is legally entitled to use the form-adhesive agreement to the coercing 
entity’s advantage (it is enforceable), or they can believe that the law 
protects them, the individual, from such unfair behavior (it is 
unenforceable).  Thus, the fact that actors tend not to read or care what it is 
that they sign is likely to produce ex-post differentiation in the perception 
of the agreements’ enforceability. 
C.  Malleable Consent and Law as Coercive Power 
If law is a means of social control, as many argue it is,54 then form-
adhesive agreements offer an appealing and convenient way for institutions 
that draw from the well of institutionalized (legal) power to exert greater 
control.  In this sense, malleable consent can be a useful measure of the 
popular response to this institutionalized form of control.   
Institutions rely on form-adhesive agreements to protect their rights 
and interests often to the detriment, exclusion or waiver of individuals’ 
rights and interests (examples are waivers, penalty clauses, etc.).  Such 
contracts are a powerful and subtle form of social control through the 
appearance of the law.  Signing a form-adhesive agreement could mean 
either that pre-existing individual rights and interests are canceled out or 
waived (the right to a jury trial, for instance), or that future benefits are 
promised to be given by the individual to the institution usually upon the 
occurrence of a described event (i.e. in credit card user agreements, 
agreeing to pay a penalty for late payments).  Institutions too could be said 
to vary in their malleable consent; they selectively enforce form-adhesive 
agreements against individuals in much the same way that laws are made 
                                                                                                                          
53 See Melvin Aron Eisenberg, The Limits of Cognition and the Limits of Contract, 47 STAN. L. 
REV. 211, 241–42 (1995) (referring to choice of many to avoid reading form agreements as being 
product of “rational ignorance” and other related limits of cognition); Hillman & Rachlinski, supra note 
7, at 446–47 (“For any single consumer, the costs of monitoring a business’s standard-form contract 
outweigh the benefits.”). 
54 See, e.g., BLACK, supra note 23, at 2 (asserting that “[l]aw is governmental social control”); 
ROSCOE POUND, SOCIAL CONTROL THROUGH LAW 18–20 (1942) (asserting that “[t]he major agencies 
of social control are morals, religion, and law” and that “[i]n the modern world, law has become the 
paramount agency of social control”); Lon L. Fuller, Law as an Instrument of Social Control and Law 
as a Facilitation of Human Interaction, 1975 BYU L. REV. 89, 92 (arguing that “the law of contracts is, 
after all, an instrument of social control directed towards those who may be inclined to ignore their 
contractual obligations”). 
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and enforced against individuals.  Numerous historical accounts exist of 
powerful actors creating rules to selectively enforce them against the less 
powerful.55  It should not be surprising then that this process is replicated 
through form-adhesive agreements.  That is, institutions create forms in the 
first place to demonstrate uniform treatment, and then permit individuals to 
escape from the oppressive waivers in a demonstration of institutional 
leniency and good will.56  
The footnoted references cited above in support of the proposition that 
institutions create forms to demonstrate uniform treatment and 
subsequently permit variable leniency are Thompson’s account of the 
Black Acts and Jerome Hall’s account of the laws of property and theft.57  
These may be read as accounts of institutional renditions of malleable 
consent.  Put another way, individuals replicate what institutions do when 
contracts (which are embodiments of state-institutional coercive authority 
and power) purport to bind them to action or inaction, in ways inconsistent 
with their interests.  The essential difference is not in the process, but in the 
outcomes. 
The frequently cited Carrier’s Case, discussed in Jerome Hall’s 
important work on the history of theft, offers a perfect example of the 
sequence by which powerful social actors (wealthy, property-rich elite) 
exhibit the institutional equivalent of malleable consent.  In 1473, before 
specific laws of theft were established to protect property, influential 
property-owners first tried to adjust existing laws to comport with their 
interests as their needs and interests were not within the intention or 
existing interpretations of established laws.58  In the Carrier’s Case, 
                                                                                                                          
55 See, e.g., JEROME HALL, THEFT, LAW AND SOCIETY 15–16 (2d ed. 1952) (noting that 
“subserviency of the courts to the militant power of the nobility became a commonplace” during 
fifteenth and sixteenth centuries and that occasionally during this time “royal letters were sent to 
justices or to sheriffs ordering them to show favor to a particular person”); EDWARD THOMPSON, 
WHIGS AND HUNTERS: THE ORIGIN OF THE BLACK ACT 259–69 (1975) (describing ways through 
which the law operated in eighteenth century England as “clearly an instrument of the de facto ruling 
class” to reinforce  its position in society through both harsh enforcement and occasional, deliberate 
leniency); Black, supra note 23, at 37–41 (citing instances where criminal conduct was used selectively 
to enforce morals or exact revenge for past wrongs); William J. Chambliss, A Sociological Analysis of 
the Law of Vagrancy, 12 SOC. PROBS. 67, 69–70 (1964) (describing purpose of first vagrancy laws “to 
force laborers (whether personally free or unfree) to accept employment at a lower wage in order to 
insure the landowner an adequate supply of labor at the price he could afford to pay”).  
56 See THOMPSON, supra note 55, at 265 (noting occasions when even “the Government itself 
retired from the courts defeated” and that “[s]uch occasions served, paradoxically, to consolidate 
power, to enhance its legitimacy, and to inhibit revolutionary movements”); Douglas Hay, Crime and 
Justice in Eighteenth—and Nineteenth—Century England, 2 CRIME & JUST. 45, 48–54 (1980) 
(detailing significant increase in capital offenses during late seventeenth and early eighteenth centuries 
and corresponding rise in public pardons and judicially urged acquittals); Mary E. Vogel, The Social 
Origins of Plea Bargaining: Conflict and the Law in the Process of State Formation, 1830–1860, 33 
LAW & SOC’Y REV. 161, 162–66, 168–69 (1999) (explaining advent of plea bargains in the American 
court system and their basis in “time-honored tradition of episodic leniency–frequent but irregular 
pardons and grants of clemency”).  
57 HALL, supra note 55; THOMPSON supra note 55, at 260. 
58 HALL, supra note 55, at 32–33. 
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existing law suggested that goods not delivered as contracted were not 
“stolen” because through the act of bailment, the carrier had established 
temporary property rights over the goods.59  When these conventional 
understandings of bailment, property and theft proved problematic in a 
world of increasing commercial exchange, the merchants and their lawyers 
strained to substantively interpret the law to comport, in this case, via the 
idea of “breaking bulk,” or opening the bails.60  When that proved too 
difficult because the rules were insufficiently flexible to suit their needs, 
new laws—whose letter comported directly with the merchants’ and the 
King's commercial interests, resulting in more harmonious accord for those 
compelled to be in compliance with the law—were concocted.61  The 
transformed laws were then more easily relied upon to induce social actors 
to comply therewith, resulting in more security for the already more 
powerful actors’ interests and wealth.62 
Following the same pattern, when individuals are faced with contracts 
that bind them in ways they do not wish to be bound, first, they may alter 
their expectations of what the contracts contain, either electing to ignore 
the agreements entirely, or to develop beliefs about their contents not based 
on careful readings but on normative expectations.  This is supported by 
the data presented in this Article—only three out of thirty-seven subjects 
knew that they signed an agreement binding them to resolve all 
employment disputes by arbitration in lieu of adjudication.63  It is also 
supported by existing scholarship on reactions to boilerplate.64  Following 
this, actors may strain to interpret existing agreements in substantive ways 
that differ from their apparent intention, arguing that the way others must 
regard these things differs from what the contract terms (institutional actor 
claims) purport to do.  It is in this step that we may see actors’ expectations 
about the norms of exchange more saliently predicting variation in 
action—some expect that their credit card late fees will be waived if they 
call and ask their lender to do so, while others do not expect that this would 
happen, and pay the fine.  The variation in malleable consent documented 
in this Article supports the occurrence of this reaction. 
The last step is perhaps the most interesting, for those on the receiving 
end of form-adhesive agreements are axiomatically not the authoritative, 
                                                                                                                          
59 Id. at 4. 
60 See id. at 4 (summarizing arguments submitted by merchants and their lawyers maintaining that 
a felony had occurred).  
61 Id. at 33. 
62 Id.  
63 All data and analysis underlying these assertions are on file with the author and are available 
for inspection upon request.   
64 See Eisenberg, supra note 53, at 240–44 (describing tendencies of modern consumers to 
consciously and unconsciously avoid reading boilerplate agreements); Hillman & Rachlinski, supra 
note 7, at 446–54 (reviewing various reasons why individuals often choose not to read standardized 
agreements).  
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powerful authors of the contracts empowered to alter the terms of the 
agreements.  So, how do less powerful social actors react to form-adhesive 
agreements?  What effect does exposure (for some, prolonged exposure) to 
these agreements have on these individuals? 
Individuals may respond in four non-mutually exclusive ways.  First, 
exposure to form-adhesive agreements may have no effect.  That is, some 
individuals may sign these agreements and not care whether their rights are 
affected or how.  They could tolerate or accept the invasiveness of the 
agreements and remain otherwise loyal to the organization(s) making them 
sign.  Indeed, a portion of the participants observed appear to fall into this 
category, at least in the short-run.  Second, actors could express “voice” 
about the agreements—complaining either to the organizations themselves, 
or more likely, in public venues.  No substantial evidence of “voice” 
emerged in this study, but this does not mean that it is not a plausible or 
viable response.  In fact, evidence of voice in response to form-adhesive 
agreements exists in other settings.65  Third, they could “exit”—that is, 
refuse to sign the relevant forms, or find creative ways of opting out, by 
actually refusing to sign, editing the document before signing, or otherwise 
avoiding such exchanges.  One could regard the existence of malleable 
consent itself as evidence in support of this response.  The act of mentally 
excusing oneself from an otherwise binding contract (that one has 
indisputably signed without duress or fraud) is a creative way to “exit” 
from the reality of an unpleasant situation. 
Lastly, actors could seek retribution specifically against the 
organization that made them sign, or more generally, against the institution 
requiring signatures on form-adhesive agreements, embodied, perhaps, by 
large, well-known firms such as internet service providers and media 
conglomerates.  Examples of such exercises of coercive, punitive power 
might include neglect of duties or other counterproductive work behavior if 
directed at a specific organization, or more generally, increased disrespect 
for institutions’ intellectual or material property rights.  In the literature on 
sociology of law and sociology of work, such a response is referred to as 
“resistance.”66 
                                                                                                                          
65 See, e.g., SULLIVAN, supra note 4, at 8–10 (detailing efforts of AT&T customer, Darcy Ting, to 
fight against the company’s attempt to include waivers of rights and arbitration agreements into service 
contracts); Posting of Angela Canterbury to Watchdog Blog, http://citizen.typepad. 
com/watchdog_blog/2007/07/protect-your-ri.html (Jul. 13, 2007, 11:38 EST) (explaining rights of 
Comcast customers to opt out of an “unfair and stealthy” arbitration agreement); The Small Print 
Project, http://smallprint.netzoo.net/reag/ (last visited Sept. 11, 2008) (encouraging awareness of form-
adhesive agreements and compelling individuals to create their own boilerplate and to sneak it into 
correspondence with institutions that force such agreements upon individuals).  
66 See generally JUSTICE AND POWER IN SOCIOLEGAL STUDIES, supra note 22 (discussing 
resistance as a weapon against oppression); MERRY, supra note 22 (discussing plaintiffs’ use of 
resistance within the court system); Ewick & Silbey, supra note 21 (discussing resistance in sociology 
of law context); Damian Hodgson, Putting on a Professional Performance: Performativity, Subversion 
and Project Management, 12 ORG. 51 (2005) (discussing resistance in sociology of work context). 
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This Article does not offer evidence of the hypothesized general 
retributional response.  That is, no evidence is presented in support of the 
theory that those who feel bound by terms of form-adhesive agreements (or 
those who do not feel that circumnavigation of such terms is an option) are 
more likely to take negative, reciprocal action against other organizations 
by doing things like stealing from them or disrespecting their intellectual 
property rights.  However, in a second study conducted of malleable 
consent in MBAs, preliminary evidence was uncovered in support of the 
connection between views about enforceability of form-adhesive 
agreements and respect for organizations’ intellectual property rights.  
Specifically, MBA students67 who said they are “not bound by [terms in 
form agreements they have signed] because [they] don’t have a choice in 
signing” or who said they are “not bound by such terms because practically 
speaking, it’s usually the case that one can negotiate his/her way out of 
them” were significantly68 more likely to agree or strongly agree that 
“acquiring music, movies or software (sold for a fee) without paying for 
them is acceptable because [they] don’t feel obligated to the organizations 
that sell these things.”  Conversely, MBAs who said that they are always 
bound by form-adhesive agreements or that they are bound by such terms 
because “practically speaking, an individual is not as powerful as an 
institution,” were significantly69 more likely to disagree or strongly 
disagree with that statement.70  
Similarly, this Article presents no direct evidence of specific 
retributional action taken against the entity promulgating the form-
adhesive agreements.  It is unclear whether the subjects who expressed the 
view that the form agreements they signed were not enforceable against 
them (high malleable consent) actually exercised coercive power against 
their employer at a greater rate than those who expressed the view that the 
form agreements were enforceable against them (low malleable consent).  
However, the current study does present preliminary evidence of the 
connection between malleable consent and what subjects reported they 
would do.  Specifically, actors who expressed the view that form-adhesive 
agreements they signed were not enforceable against them (high malleable 
consent) were more likely to express views consistent with the notion of 
the employment relationship as “transactional”—that is, as merely a 
market exchange, devoid of loyalty or commitment.   
Therefore this Article first argues that studying interpretations of 
enforceability of agreements as a construct in itself is worthwhile because 
                                                                                                                          
67 n = 132. 
68 p = .002. 
69 p = .04. 
70 All data and analysis underlying these assertions are on file with the author and are available 
for inspection upon request. 
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such perceptions are useful to understanding a contextualized form of legal 
consciousness, as well as trust in the state and other regulatory institutions.  
The next part of this Article systematically examines the construct in an 
applied context, first using malleable consent as an intervening variable to 
reveal otherwise obfuscated interpretations of law across different socio-
economic groups, and second as an independent variable predicting 
employees’ conception of their employment relationship as transactional or 
relational. 
III.  HYPOTHESES 
A.  Malleable Consent and Differences Across Socio-Economic Status 
As Richard Ely remarked, “[w]hen economic forces make possible 
oppression and deprivation of liberty, oppression and deprivation of liberty 
express themselves in contract.”71  The literature on law as a differentiated 
resource posits that perceptions of law will be different across socio-
economic status groups such that higher SES actors will feel less 
“oppressed” and “deprived of liberty” than lower SES actors.  If this is the 
case, interpretations of enforceability of form-adhesive agreements should 
reflect this distinction, revealing how unlevel the playing field is, 
regardless of its appearance to the contrary.  Put differently, everyone has 
to sign these forms, but higher SES actors likely feel less bound by them 
than lower SES actors.  This leads to the first hypothesis: 
(H1)  Higher SES actors (those with greater educational 
attainment and more job alternatives with lower dependence 
on their employers) are more likely to regard form-adhesive 
agreements they have signed as unenforceable than lower 
SES actors (those with lower educational attainment, fewer 
job alternatives and hence greater dependence on their 
employers). 
In other words, higher SES actors should exhibit more malleable 
consent and lower SES subjects should exhibit less malleable consent.  If 
supported, this hypothesis would strengthen the notion that different social 
groups hold different views about law relative to their ability to 
circumnavigate a contract purporting to bind them to terms contra their 
interests.  Previous research on legal consciousness has demonstrated that 
those who regard law as more accessible—as a sword wieldable on their 
behalf—are often better-educated, with higher paying jobs, and greater 
                                                                                                                          
71 Bruce E. Kaufman, John R. Commons and the Wisconsin School on Industrial Relations 
Strategy and Policy, 57 INDUS. & LAB. REL. REV. 3, 8 (2003) (quoting Richard Ely, President, Am. 
Ass’n for Labor Legislation).  
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socio-economic status generally.72  Such individuals are represented by the 
MBA subjects in the second study reported in this Article.  Those who 
regard law as a shield, protecting organizations from the ineffective slings 
and arrows wielded by individuals, are often less educated, with lower 
paying jobs, and lower socio-economic status generally.  This group is 
represented by the employees in the first study reported below.  If 
malleable consent is a useful concept for understanding legal 
consciousness (derivative of institutional-legal faith or fear), it should 
reflect this dichotomy. 
B.  Transactional–Relational Scaled Responses to Conflict 
The formal right of a worker to enter into any contract 
whatsoever with any employer whatsoever does not in 
practice represent for the employment seeker even the 
slightest freedom in the determination of his own conditions 
of work, and it does not guarantee him any influence on this 
process.73  
The next step is to explore the relationship between interpretations of 
enforceability (malleable consent) and the way in which individuals 
exchange with the organizations requiring them to sign these agreements.  
This was accomplished by developing a transactional-relational scale based 
on Ian Macneil’s influential work.74  Existing research shows important 
differences between employees who view exchanges as relational and 
those who view exchanges as transactional.  Employees who view their 
relationship as “transactional” tend to regard the employment exchange as 
primarily one of specific monetizable exchanges (pay for attendance) over 
a specific time period.75  Such a transactional perspective focuses on the 
essential exchange of pay (high pay, merit pay and advancement, for 
instance) for work, to the exclusion of other typically longer-term 
                                                                                                                          
72 See generally BLACK, supra note 23, at 1–10 (discussing variations in application of law across 
social, economic, and educational settings); Roscoe Pound, Introduction to EHRLICH, supra note 23, at 
xxxi–xxxvi (discussing trends of legal behavior at group level rather than individual level); Black, 
supra note 23, at 34, 41–42 (noting that those of lower socio-economic status receive less legal 
protection). 
73 WEBER, supra note 26, at 188. 
74 See generally Ian R. Macneil, Relational Contract: What We Do and Do Not Know, 1985 WIS. 
L. REV. 483 (discussing effect of relational thinking on contract formation). 
75 See Marcie A. Cavanaugh & Raymond A. Noe, Antecedents and Consequences of Relational 
Components of the New Psychological Contract, 20 J. ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAV. 323, 323–26 (1999) 
(noting that transactional contracts involve “specific, short-term, monetary obligations that require 
limited involvement”); Denise M. Rousseau, New Hire Perceptions of Their Own and Their 
Employer’s Obligations: A Study of Psychological Contracts, 11 J. ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAV. 389, 391 
(1990) (noting that transactional contracts typically involve “the absence of long-term commitments”).   
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elements.76  In contrast, those who view their employment as a “relational” 
exchange have open-ended agreements to establish and maintain a 
relationship involving non-monetizable elements like trust, loyalty, job 
security, career development, and support with personal problems.77  In 
“relationally-governed exchanges . . . enforcement of obligations, promises 
and expectations occur[s] through . . . norms of flexibility, solidarity, and 
information exchange.”78  This is not the case for transactionally-governed 
exchanges.79  
One way to observe whether employees view their employment 
exchanges as transactional or relational is to observe their responses to 
workplace conflicts of varying severity.  Relational-view employees tend 
to respond to conflicts at work with more loyalty, and less exit and 
neglect.80  They are more likely to resort to “voice”81 and to afford their 
employers the opportunity to restore order when problems arise, resorting 
to internal organizational outlets such as human resources departments, 
instead of external ones like lawyers or governmental agencies.  On the 
other hand, transactional-view employees are more likely to go outside of 
the organization, either exiting more quickly in response to conflicts, or 
resorting to external means of redress.  Similarly, research has found that 
psychological contract breach has a greater negative impact in terms of 
decreased job satisfaction, role performance and organizational citizenship 
behavior on relational-minded employees.82 
                                                                                                                          
76 See Sandra L. Robinson et al., Changing Obligations and the Psychological Contract: A 
Longitudinal Study, 37 ACAD. MGMT. J. 137, 138–41 (1994) (discussing the effect of perceived 
changes in employment obligations). 
77 Id.; see also Denise M. Rousseau & Judi McLean Parks, The Contracts of Individuals and 
Organizations, in RESEARCH IN ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAVIOR 1, 1 (L.L. Cummings & Barry M. Staw 
eds., 1993) (presenting transactional and relational exchanges as points along a contractual continuum); 
Elizabeth Wolfe Morrison & Sandra L. Robinson, When Employees Feel Betrayed: A Model of How 
Psychological Contract Violation Develops, 22 ACAD. MGMT. REV. 226, 227 (1997) (“[V]iolation 
decreases employees’ trust toward their employers, satisfaction with their jobs and organizations, 
perceived obligation to their organizations, and intentions to remain.”). 
78 Laura Poppo & Todd Zenger, Do Formal Contracts and Relational Governance Function as 
Substitutes or Complements?, 23 STRATEGIC MGMT. J. 707, 710 (2002). 
79 See Rousseau, supra note 75, at 391 (“[T]ransactional contracts involve acquisition of people 
with specific skills to meet present needs . . . [in] the absence of long-term commitments.”). 
80 See William H. Turnley & Daniel C. Feldman, The Impact of Psychological Contract 
Violations on Exit, Voice, Loyalty, and Neglect, 52 HUM. REL. 895, 896–99, 902–03 (1999) (studying 
managers in this context); Jacqueline A.M. Coyle-Shapiro, A Psychological Contract Perspective on 
Organizational Citizenship Behavior, 23 J. ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAV. 927 (2002) (studying public 
sector employees). 
81 Dan Farrell, Exit, Voice, Loyalty, and Neglect as Responses to Job Satisfaction: A 
Multidimensional Scaling Study, 26 ACAD. MGMT. J. 596, 597–98 (1983); see also ALBERT O. 
HIRSCHMAN, EXIT, VOICE AND LOYALTY 30 (1970) (“To resort to voice . . . is for the customer or 
member to make an attempt at changing the practices, policies, and outputs of the firm . . . .”). 
82 Sandra L. Robinson, Trust and Breach of the Psychological Contract, 41 ADMIN. SCI. Q. 574, 
576–80 (1996); Sandra L. Robinson & Denise M. Rousseau, Violating the Psychological Contract: Not 
the Exception but the Norm, 15 J. ORG. BEHAV. 245, 245–49 (1994); William H. Turnley & Daniel C. 
Feldman, Re-Examining the Effects of Psychological Contract Violations: Unmet Expectations and Job 
Dissatisfaction as Mediators, 21 J. ORG. BEHAV. 25, 25–29 (2000).  
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Table 1 depicts four types of common employment disputes and their 
associated predicted transactional and relational views.  The disputes range 
from mild to severe forms of breach of psychological expectations—the 
first one involves the breach of the obligation to provide a workplace free 
of co-worker to co-worker disputes; the second, the breach of the 
obligation to comply with internal company rules about fairness of 
treatment; the third, a breach of the obligation of the organization to 
comply with external legal constraints; and the fourth, a breach of the 
obligation to provide fair treatment and to comply with external legal 
constraints with the ultimate negative consequence of unilateral 
termination of the employment relationship. 
 
Table 1:  Transactional-Relational Comparative Responses to Employment Conflicts 
Responses  Type of Dispute 
Transactional Relational 
1 Non-Legal 
Interpersonal 
Dispute 
Confront co-worker (As 
subject perceives this issue 
to be beyond the scope of 
the employment transaction, 
he will not trust 
Management to remedy it) 
Report incident to 
manager 
(exchange of 
workplace free of 
harassment for 
policing the 
workplace) 
2 Non-Legal Dispute 
between Individual 
& Organization 
Do not show up for work 
(An internal rule was 
broken, so subject owes the 
organization nothing) 
Show up to work 
(exchange loyalty 
for future fair 
treatment, or 
security) 
3 Legal Dispute 
between Individual 
& Organization 
(ongoing 
relationship) 
Pursue outside legal 
assistance—to ensure that 
the organization does not 
violate subject’s rights 
Report the matter 
internally—trust 
the organization to 
correct the wrong 
and restore the 
status quo; do not 
resort to outside 
legal assistance 
4 Legal Dispute 
between Individual 
& Organization 
(Unilateral 
termination of 
relationship) 
Pursue legal remedies 
against organization 
Give Company a 
chance to correct 
the wrong and 
restore the 
relationship 
 
Previous literature has mostly, if not all, but ignored interpretations of 
the law and, specifically, the written contracts employees have signed in 
assessing how employees view this exchange relationship and in predicting 
how transactionally or relationally they view their employment 
relationships.  In fact, at least one paper claimed that “formal stipulations 
employers . . . contribute only slightly to general perceptions of contractual 
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obligations.”83  This Article tests the relationship between interpretations 
of enforceability of contract and the transactional-relational scaled view of 
work.  The concept of malleable consent in the employment context is a 
function of how much perceived (not actual) flexibility there is in a binding 
agreement one has signed that purportedly limits legal remedial power 
against an employer.  Subjects who view work transactionally are more 
likely to care whether there is such flexibility, and are therefore more 
likely to report the belief that such elasticity exists, because they are the 
ones most likely to resort to non-relational responses described in Table 1.  
Conversely, subjects who regard the employment relationship as more 
relationally oriented are less likely to express concern about their ability to 
escape a clause limiting their rights to sue their employers because (1) 
relationally-minded employees prefer to exchange relationally instead of 
litigiously, (2) they do not believe that the formal, written contract 
dominates their employment exchange anyway, and (3) to the extent that 
such subjects believe that the formal written contract controls their 
employment relationship, they are more likely to trust their employers to 
treat them fairly in the long run. 
Thus, the second hypothesis emerges: 
(H2)  An inverse relationship exists between a relational 
view of exchange and malleable consent. 
This means that the more one regards his employment relationship as 
“relational,” (and is thus willing to trade loyalty and commitment for a 
promise of some future benefit such as fair treatment, job security, etc.), 
the more likely one is to express the belief that the form-adhesive 
agreement he signed as a condition of employment is enforceable against 
him.  Conversely, the more one regards his employment relationship as 
“transactional,” the more likely one is to express the belief that the form-
adhesive agreement he signed is unenforceable against him.  Put 
differently, the current study presents preliminary evidence of the 
connection between malleable consent and what subjects reported they 
would do in these conflict scenarios.  Specifically, actors who expressed 
the view that the form-adhesive agreement they signed were not 
enforceable against them (high malleable consent) were more likely to 
express views consistent with the notion of the employment relationship as 
“transactional”—that is, as merely a market exchange, devoid of loyalty or 
commitment. 
For instance, Subject 14, a forty-five-year-old African-American 
woman who had been working for her current employer for over three 
years, reported that the form-adhesive agreement she signed was “just a 
                                                                                                                          
83 Rousseau, supra note 75, at 397 (emphasis added).  
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bunch of you-know . . . . ”  She reported further that, “I think they’d try to 
enforce it, but basically, the way things are now, you can get a good 
lawyer, and they can get around anything.”  This is an expression of high 
malleable consent because it is her opinion that a contract into which she 
entered admittedly free of duress or fraud is nonetheless unenforceable 
against her.  She expressed a correspondingly high transactional view of 
work, demonstrated by the consistent theme in her predictions of how she 
would respond to hypothetical workplace conflicts.  For instance, she 
would not trust management to resolve a hypothetical interpersonal dispute 
between her and a co-worker, opting instead to handle the situation on her 
own.  She would not come in on her day off if requested to do so, saying, 
“I would just be like, ‘I’m sorry, I already made plans.’”  If she were 
sexually harassed, she reported that she would tell management, “I guess 
you’re going to fire me, and I guess I’m going to consult my lawyer,” 
without affording the organization an opportunity to address the situation.  
If she were wrongfully terminated, she would “find an attorney” without 
hesitation.  In sum, her responses to hypothetical conflicts at work 
evidence a tendency to view her exchange with her employer as 
transactional, not relational, and with a corresponding high degree of 
malleable consent. 
IV.  RESEARCH METHODS 
A.  Study 1: “InnoTech” (Low Socio-Economic Status Sample) 
The construct of malleable consent emerged from an inductive field 
study of a sample of thirty-seven current employees (“sales associates”) of 
a national electronics retailer (herein referred to as “InnoTech,” a 
pseudonym) in twelve locations in Southern California.  InnoTech was 
selected for study because of its policy requiring its sales associates to sign 
a mandatory arbitration agreement upon hire.  The locations were 
randomly chosen from a pool of thirty stores within a forty-mile 
geographic proximity to one another.  Informants were approached outside 
the retail shops on their breaks, or before or after their shifts.  Informants 
were offered five-dollar gift cards for their participation in the study and 
were informed that all information provided would be anonymous and 
confidential.  To protect participants’ anonymity, no personally identifying 
information was gathered other than subjects’ voices that were recorded 
upon receipt of consent.  Data gathered also consisted of the author’s field 
notes of observations and unrecorded conversations. 
Informants were 84% men, with a mean age of 27 years84 and an 
                                                                                                                          
84 Standard deviation = 5.12 years. 
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average organizational tenure of 21 months.85  The median duration of 
employment was 14 months.  Subjects were 51% white, 19% black, 19% 
Hispanic and 11% other.  Based on observation of sales personnel in each 
location, this sample closely approximated the population of sales 
associates employed in the geographical region sampled. 
Subjects were asked about their alternative job opportunities, work 
experience, education, training on and off the job, what they signed when 
they started their jobs, how fairly they thought their employer treated them 
overall, and whether they considered their current employment situation a 
“job” or a “career.”  Only 19% (seven respondents) reported that this work 
was a career.86  Fifty-four percent of the participants reported having 
access to lawyers.  The mean rating of InnoTech’s “overall fairness” of 
treatment on a 5-point Likert scale was 3.7.87  Based on the researcher’s 
observation of sales personnel in each location, this sample closely 
approximated the population of sales associates employed in the 
geographical region sampled.  Table 2 is a correlation matrix of the salient 
descriptive demographic attributes of the sample. 
 
Table 2:  Correlation Table of InnoTech Respondents’ Demographic Attributes 
 1.♦ 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8
. 
1. Female         
2. Black .162        
3. Hispanic .162 -.065       
4. Other -.153 -.048 -.048      
5. Age .397*** .165 .070 -.019     
6. Tenure .010 -.057 .193 -.040 .393***    
7. Career1 -.025 -.233 .120 .276* .056 .338**   
8. Lawyer2 .047 -.115 .113 -.211 -.267 -.148 .029  
9. Fair3 -.168 -.596*** -.018 .029 -.408*** -.205 .137 0 
Note: ***Significant at 1% level; **Significant at 5% level; *Significant at 10% level.  
♦ Numbers across the row correspond with variables down the first column:  1.=Female, 2=Black, 
etc. 
1 This variable is an indicator variable coded “1” if subjects said that their current employment   
was “career” as opposed to a “job.” 
2 This variable is coded “1” if subjects reported knowing a lawyer, and “0” otherwise.  
3 This variable is a 5-point Likert-style rating of the overall fairness of treatment.  
 
According to the subjects, they are highly substitutable; their jobs 
require little if any training.  Several subjects complained about the high 
rate of turn-over among associates.  Additionally, InnoTech subjects 
                                                                                                                          
85 Standard deviation = 21 months. 
86 Not surprisingly, this view correlates positively and significantly with job tenure (.338; p = 
.04). 
87 Standard deviation = .91.  The correlation between reported fair treatment by the organization 
and subjects being black is, somewhat shockingly, highly negative and highly significant (-.596; p = 
.0001), as was the correlation between subjects’ age and fairness ratings (-.408; p = .001), indicating 
that older and/or black workers reported significantly worse overall fair treatment. 
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generally expressed the notion that their jobs are the “best they can get” 
and that alternative work is not readily available.  Almost all subjects 
completed one or two years of college, having mostly attended local 
community college and dropped out either to join the workforce or to have 
children.  Other subjects were still attending college at the time of the 
interviews.  For these reasons, this sample was considered to have 
uniformly lower SES actors than the MBA sample discussed in greater 
detail below. 
Subjects were also asked about how they would respond to the four 
vignettes described in Table 3, designed to correspond with the types of 
disputes set forth in Table 1, in order to examine the relationship between 
malleable consent and the transactional-relational view of the employment 
exchange. 
 
Table 3:  Descriptions of Vignettes 
 Type of Dispute Vignette Description 
1 Non-Legal Interpersonal 
Dispute 
“A co-worker is bothering you to the point 
that it interferes with your ability to do your 
job.” 
2 Non-Legal Dispute between 
Individual & Organization 
“You are told to come in to work on a day 
that you already scheduled off and you have 
plans to be with family or friends.” 
 
3 Legal Dispute between 
Individual & Organization 
(ongoing relationship) 
“Your direct supervisor tells you that if you 
do not sleep with him or her that your 
employment will be terminated.” 
 
4 Legal Dispute between 
Individual & Organization 
(terminated relationship) 
“Your employment is terminated because of 
your gender, race, national origin or 
religion.” 
 
 
Subjects’ coded responses to the four vignettes formed the bases for a 
scaled transactional-relational measure.  The more subjects responded in 
ways consistent with a relational view, the higher they scored on the scale.  
The fewer relational points, the less relationally they were estimated to 
view their work relationship.  Subjects with zero points (who had exhibited 
no relationally coded responses) were considered purely transactional.  The 
six coded variables used for the scale and their distribution across the two 
studies are listed in Table 4. 
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Table 4:  Comparison of Relational Scale Components Across Studies 
Variable Name InnoTech MBAs Welch Diff of 
Means Test 
Hyp1_manager_only 60% 3.51% p < .001 
Hyp1_self_help (rev. 
coded) 
17.14% 4.39% p < .06 
Hyp2_show_up 30.56% 60.23% p < .05 
Hyp2_sub/alt 8.33% 25.69% p < .05 
Hyp3_citizen 48.65% 33.04% p < .10 
Hyp4_HR 39.39% 11.93% p < .05 
 
Figure 1 below depicts the distribution of transactional-relational 
scores across the two studies.  Polychoric principle component analysis 
(PCA) and factor analysis each sufficiently confirms the internal validity of 
the scale when the variables “Hyp1_self_help” and “Hyp2_sub/alt” are 
excluded.88  Including these two variables renders the internal validation 
methodologically problematic.89  However, the two variables are included 
in the model because of their strong facial validity and the fact that the 
results reported herein remain robust whether the two variables are 
included or not. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                          
88 Polychoric PCA of the 4-elements scale demonstrates ample support for scalar convergence on 
a single element.  The eigenvalue of the primary element is 1.85.  The difference between this 
eigenvalue and the next closest is 1.05.  This result was replicated with factor analysis (principle 
eigenvalue = .56, with difference between that and next closest as .62) for those uncomfortable with 
PCA, although it is the author’s opinion that PCA is the more appropriate tool for this analysis. 
89 This is because the two variables excluded from the full model (“Hyp1_self_help” and 
“Hyp2_sub/alt”) are each mostly or entirely orthogonal to the included measures of responses to the 
respective vignettes (“Hyp1_manager_only” from first vignette and “Hyp2_showup” from second).  
For instance, 98% of subjects who said they would show up in response to the second vignette 
(“Hyp2_showup” = 1) did not suggest that they would also try to find a substitute or alternative 
(“Hyp2_sub/alt” = 0).  This makes logical sense in the same way that it makes sense that those who 
said that they would take matters into their own hands in response to the first vignette 
(“Hyp1_self_help” = 1) did not say that they would exclusively report the matter to their manager 
(“Hyp1_manager_only” = 0).  
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Figure 1: Transactional-Relational Scale Scores (InnoTech: N=37; MBAs: N=114) 
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The first variable, “Hyp1_manager_only,” is coded 1 (and otherwise 0) 
for subjects who responded to the first vignette (an interpersonal dispute 
between co-workers) by saying that they would bring the matter to the 
attention of their manager before or without addressing the offending co-
worker themselves.  This action is consistent with the relational view 
because it demonstrates a willingness to trust management with the 
resolution of non-legal disputes without first attempting to resolve the 
matter on one’s own.  While the difference between subjects who 
exclusively reported the issue to management and those who confronted 
the offending subject first and then reported to management may not 
appear significant, using this measure offers a more conservative and 
clearer divide between subjects.  In other words, those who exclusively 
trusted management with this situation are incrementally more relational 
than those who attempted to resolve the situation on their own first. 
The second variable, “Hyp1_self_help,” is coded 1 (and otherwise 0) if 
subjects responded to the first vignette by taking matters into their own 
hands, often literally threatening to resolve the situation with violence or 
other means of self-help.  It could also be considered “revenge” as it is in 
other research.90  This response is inconsistent with the relational view 
because it demonstrates subjects’ belief that they cannot rely on the 
organization to resolve an interpersonal dispute.  This variable is reverse-
coded for the relational scale. 
Similarly, subjects were considered more relational if they said that 
they would show up to work in response to the second vignette (for 
example, they are scheduled for a day off, they have plans with family or 
                                                                                                                          
90 Karl Aquino et al., How Employees Respond to Personal Offense: The Effects of Blame 
Attribution, Victim Status, and Offender Status on Revenge and Reconciliation in the Workplace, 86 J. 
APPLIED PSYCH. 52, 52 (2001).  
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friends, but they are asked to come in anyway).  The third variable, 
“Hyp2_showup,” is coded 1 (and otherwise 0) for subjects who said that 
they would show up to work on a day they had scheduled off but were 
required to come in anyway.  This is perhaps the clearest and most 
traditional measure of a relational exchange view of work while the 
employment relationship is intact.  Specifically, these subjects are more 
likely to view the exchange as ongoing and one in which loyalty is traded 
for security (or other measures). 
The fourth variable, “Hyp2_sub/alt,” is coded 1 (and otherwise 0) if 
subjects responded to the second vignette by proposing that they secure a 
substitute for the work or suggesting that they find an alternative way of 
accomplishing the work.  Again, this measure is a fairly clear 
demonstration of a relational view as opposed to a transactional view of 
work because it indicates subjects’ desire to exchange the above-and-
beyond task of finding a way to accomplish the organization’s goals in 
exchange for some future hard-to-quantify measure like security. 
The fifth variable composing the transactional-relational scale is 
“Hyp3_citizen.”  This variable is coded 1 (and otherwise 0) for subjects 
who responded to the third vignette (they are sexually harassed by a 
supervisor) by bringing the matter to the attention of Human Resources 
without threatening to bring a lawsuit or contact an attorney.  Again, this is 
classic organizational citizenship behavior, and indicative of a relational 
view of work. 
The sixth and final variable included in the full scale is “Hyp4_HR,” 
which is coded 1 (and otherwise 0) when subjects reported giving the 
organization a second chance even after their employment was terminated 
for unlawful reasons described in the fourth vignette (“your employment is 
terminated because of your gender, race, national origin or religion”).  
Subjects who sought to appeal their termination within the firm were coded 
as incrementally more relational than those who did not. 
1.  What Subjects Thought They Signed 
Toward the conclusion of each interview, subjects were shown a copy 
of the actual mandatory arbitration agreement that InnoTech requires all 
sales associates to sign and were asked to identify the document.  Most 
subjects positively identified the document as one that they had to sign on 
their day of hire.  The researcher then explained the clause in the 
arbitration agreement to the subjects.  Specifically, subjects were told that, 
if signers of the agreement wished to go to court to sue the employer, this 
agreement purportedly prevented them from doing so (either during the 
employment relationship or after it ended), requiring them instead to resort 
to arbitration to resolve any and all disputes, even ones like those 
discussed earlier in the interview, including the third and fourth vignettes.  
Subjects were asked if they were to try to bring a lawsuit against InnoTech, 
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whether InnoTech could in fact compel them to divert their claims to 
arbitration instead of court as the document purports.  Responses to this 
question formed the basis for the measure of subjects’ malleable consent. 
Thirty-six of the thirty-seven subjects remembered signing something 
when they started their jobs at InnoTech.  Thirty-one of the thirty-six 
(86%) articulated what they remembered signing.91  Sixty-nine percent 
mentioned signing something innocuous like tax forms or generic 
paperwork.  For instance, Subject 2 reported, “. . . just a lot of documents, 
you know, making sure that I'm telling the truth about who I am and my 
person and everything.  W-2 forms, that's about all I can remember.”  
Subject 7 reported, “All the tax forms, I think it was just the tax forms, 
yeah, they made you fill out a whole bunch of stuff, like name and address, 
we watched a bunch of videos, like learning on the computers, we call it ‘e-
learning,’ that’s pretty much it.”  Another typical response was Subject 
28’s: “Just the general initial employment forms, like uh . . . oh boy, I don’t 
even remember what they were specifically anymore.”  
Forty-two percent mentioned having to sign to consent to invasive 
terms like a drug test, a non-competition agreement or an “at-will” 
employment policy.  Examples of the second category are as follows: 
“I skimmed through them . . . so . . . [Do you have any 
recollection of what they said?]  I know there's a sexual 
harassment one . . . .”  (Subj. 2). 
“. . . drug test, and no competition clause, you know, you 
can't work for any other [descriptive term deleted] company . 
. . .”  (Subj. 3). 
“There was a non-competition agreement stating that I 
would not work at the same time on any project that 
[InnoTech] currently offers, there were a couple of other 
agreements, mainly, the contract saying that I would work for 
[InnoTech] and get paid, but the non-competition agreement 
is the most important of the multiple restrictions.  [Anything 
else that you recall?]  Basically, like what my duties would 
be and stuff like that.”  (Subj. 10). 
“It’s like a contract between store and employee.  We 
have to do certain things, and we have our certain rights, but 
they can fire us whenever.”  (Subj. 16). 
                                                                                                                          
91 Tenure on the job had no statistically significant relation to the ability to recall or the 
willingness to report what the subjects signed (p = .7142), although everyone who had been on the job 
for less than seven months (n = 6) was able to describe something about what they signed.  The least 
time on the job of someone unable to recall what they signed was seven months.  Six individuals with 
the most tenure in the study (35, 36(x3), 48 and 120 months) were able to recall and describe what they 
remembered signing when they were hired. 
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“Employment, . . . what do you call it, you know, the 
whole, they can fire you for whatever reason . . . the 
employment sheet.  [What’s your understanding of that?]  
They can fire you for almost whatever reason, pretty much, 
as long as they have a valid reason.  [They get to fire you?  
That’s what it says?]  That’s pretty much what it is.”  (Subj. 
17). 
“. . . a paper that said that they're an open employer, 
which means that they can fire you at any time for any 
reason, that it was ok to drug test me.”  (Subj. 21). 
“A whole bunch of release papers basically saying that 
[InnoTech] is not held liable for a whole bunch of stuff.  
[Anything else?]  Not to my knowledge.”  (Subj. 33). 
Only 17% reported signing either a mandatory arbitration agreement or 
the waiver of the right to sue the employer.  The following are examples of 
responses in this last group: 
“Tax papers, and arbitration in case of dispute with the 
company, and later on they put in some security thing we had 
to sign for, regarding the work environment and stuff like 
that, and insurance papers, that came out later.  [The second 
thing you mentioned was an arbitration form, do you know 
what that was?]  Yeah, basically, it’s to protect [InnoTech] in 
case we want to sue them in case anything happens.  
Basically, what the arbitration form said was that in case we 
had any dispute regarding labor issues or in case there was a 
wrongful termination lawsuit or anything like that, we 
wouldn’t go to court, we will have to resort to arbitration, and 
arbitration only.  [How do you feel about that?]  I don’t think 
it’s fair.  [Why not?]  I don’t think it’s fair because it’s 
dragging.  It’s not something you can go in and get out.  It 
doesn’t give you the options of—They’re protected 
regardless, no matter what.  Because if the two parties don’t 
agree, you’re stuck in arbitration forever, so at some point 
you have to settle—I think they get you over time, because 
you’re going to get tired of going to arbitration.  Because you 
sign an agreement that says that you can’t go to court, that 
you have to stay in arbitration.  [So, why did you sign it if 
you think it’s unfair?]  Well, I needed a job.  Most people do 
need a job, half the people don’t know what it is, and when 
you need a job, you say, ‘what’s the worst that could happen 
here?’  You know?  Worst scenario, I quit.  So, you’re like, 
‘ok.’”  (Subj. 13). 
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“[A] don't sue us kind of thing, where, you know, where 
if, something happens here, and it's not, it wasn't through 
workman's comp or anything like that, that I can't sue them or 
anything like that. . . .  If something happened to the point 
where I either got hurt and I wanted to pursue it further than 
workman's comp, that wouldn't be possible after I signed the 
proper paperwork to not allow me to . . . and then also, if 
something else happened, and [InnoTech] took care of it, but 
I wanted to take it further, one, they would try to talk me out 
of it, and two, they'd probably have me sign something that 
says I couldn't do it anyways.  [And that's OK with you?]  
Well, nothing really happens, as long as you keep your nose 
clean and don't screw with the girls, you'll be cool.”  (Subj. 
3). 
“Basically things that I won’t sue them, that I’ll go within 
the company, legal issues, nothing life threatening, nothing 
that you wouldn’t sign at any other job, nothing that doesn’t 
protect the company.  [What do you mean by, ‘protect the 
company?’]  Basically saying, that like, for example, if you 
have issues with a manager or something, you’re not going to 
a lawyer and sue the company, you’re going to go within it; 
there’s a word, I can’t remember the word now, that you 
basically do all legal issues within the company, that, and of 
course, the ‘U word’ is more or less illegal.  [What’s the U 
word?]  The union.  [Did you sign something that said that 
you couldn’t join a union?]  No, but, . . . no . . . but . . . 
there’s nothing there that says that you can join a union, you 
know. . . .”  (Subj. 18).   
It may be worth noting the forms that InnoTech actually gives to new 
hires.  It is my understanding based on information available to the public 
that in addition to the mandatory arbitration agreement, InnoTech gives all 
new hires an I-9 list of acceptable documents (to confirm an employee’s 
identity), a W-4 form, a Fair Credit Reporting Act (FCRA) form notifying 
employees that the company may run a background check on them, and a 
form notifying employees of InnoTech’s drug testing policy (employees 
are required to consent on demand).  Employees are also required to 
acknowledge with their signature receipt of InnoTech’s policy forbidding 
illegal forms of harassment, including but not limited to sexual harassment.  
These policies have been in place long enough to cover all respondents in 
this study with the possible exception of Subject 23, who has been with the 
company for ten years. 
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2.  Subjects’ Malleability of Consent 
Participants were asked to identify the arbitration agreement that, 
according to the organization, all employees are required to sign.92  Sixty-
seven percent of subjects positively identified the document.  This 
percentage is interesting considering the low number of participants who 
knew they had signed an agreement waiving their right to a jury trial, 
requiring them instead to resolve all disputes by final and binding 
arbitration.  Thus, most subjects recognized the form they signed when 
shown the actual piece of paper, but did not know to what it was they had 
agreed.  Consistent with the Legal Realist scholarship exploring the 
relationship between law as experienced and law as written, this makes the 
participants’ interpretations of this document an even more salient 
predictor of future behavior than the document’s terms themselves. 
Participants were then asked to reflect on whether InnoTech could stop 
them from bringing a lawsuit and require them instead to bring such claims 
to arbitration as the document purports.  Their responses were varied, but 
for the most part, subjects either expressed the belief that they would be 
“stuck” with the agreement if they signed it, or that the agreement was 
unenforceable even though they signed it.  Their responses formed the 
basis of the subjects’ malleable consent.  Thirty-one percent of the subjects 
expressed the view that the agreement was unenforceable against them, 
even if they signed away the right to bring a lawsuit against the company 
in court.  Their explanations were predominated by the notion that the law 
protects individuals against institutions such as InnoTech.  They 
recognized that InnoTech could require them to sign whatever it desired at 
the outset of their employment, but that the law, embodied by the 
employment-plaintiff’s bar, in their view championed for individuals’ 
rights, and would therefore permit circumnavigation of bothersome 
contract provisions.  The views of those who formed this group in the 
InnoTech sample echoed sentiments expressed in Patricia Ewick and Susan 
S. Silbey’s classic study, The Common Place of Law, in which they 
characterized responses as perceiving law as a commodity in which being 
able to “get” a lawyer or “afford” a good lawyer “exerted a profound effect 
                                                                                                                          
92 After being asked if they recognized InnoTech’s arbitration agreement, three provisions of the 
agreement were pointed out to them in the text of the document.  First, the provision that specifies that 
InnoTech and the signer agree to “settle any and all” disputes or controversies arising out of the 
employment relationship by “final and binding arbitration before a neutral arbitrator;” with the 
examples as specified in the form of claims covered, including ones like sexual harassment (vignette 
three) and terminations because of race, religion or national origin (vignette four).  Second, the 
provision that states that the signer understands that if he does file a lawsuit, InnoTech “may use this 
Agreement in support of its request to the court to dismiss the lawsuit and require me instead to use 
arbitration.”  Third, the provision that states that signers have three days from the date of signature to 
notify InnoTech’s Human Resources Department that they have withdrawn their consent to the 
agreement, but doing so will render them ineligible for employment with InnoTech. 
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on their decisions in regard to disputes and grievances.”93  Two exemplary 
high malleable consent views are as follows:  
 “I think it’s [the agreement] stupid.  [Subject laughs.]  
[Why?]  Because nowadays, you can go around that and still 
get a lawyer, and still go to trial.  [So you think that the 
arbitration agreement isn’t enforceable?]  Yeah, I think it’s 
just a bunch of you-know.  [What makes you think that it’s 
not enforceable?]  Well, I think they’d try to enforce it, but 
basically, the way things are now, you can get a good lawyer, 
and they can get around anything.”  (Subj. 14).   
“Ultimately, you can sign anything you want, but you 
pay enough for the right lawyer, and it doesn’t matter what 
you’ve signed.  [Meaning, you don’t think it’s an enforceable 
agreement?]  No.  [Why not?]  It’s . . . there’s always a 
loophole, there’s always a way, and if you have the money 
and the time, and you have a lawyer that’s greedy enough and 
says, ‘I’ll get a cut of this,’ I guarantee you, there’s 
somebody who is going to find a way to get you out of this 
agreement.”  (Subj. 19). 
B.  Study 2:  MBA Students (High Socio-Economic Status Sample) 
The second study consisted of 115 students from a prestigious East 
Coast business school.  Primarily second-year MBA students were asked to 
complete a larger online survey as part of a class.94  Completing the survey 
was a requirement in the class, so the response rate was approximately 
100%.  Subjects were 62% male; approximately 65% of the subjects were 
native English-speakers, and 65% were also partially or fully U.S. 
nationals.  Sixty-one percent reported having direct access to a lawyer.  
The mean self-reported score of knowledge and experience with American 
law was 2.895 on a 7-point Likert scale where “0” is no knowledge or 
experience and “7” is extensive knowledge or experience.  The inter-
correlations of the demographic variables are reported in Table 5. 
 
 
                                                                                                                          
93 EWICK & SILBEY, supra note 21, at 152–55.  See generally Patricia Ewick & Susan S. Silbey, 
Common Knowledge and Ideological Critique: The Significance of Knowing that the “Haves” Come 
Out Ahead, 33 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 1025 (1999) (examining expectations and beliefs held by ordinary 
Americans about the American legal system). 
94 It is unfortunate that the MBAs were not surveyed on their first jobs—they were all current 
students, on the job market and mostly negotiating with employers for their first post-MBA jobs, but 
not currently employed.  It is uncertain what would change in these data if the MBAs were on their first 
jobs, but this limitation is recognized nonetheless. 
95 Standard deviation = 1.2. 
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Table 5:  Correlation Table of MBAs’ Descriptive Variables 
 1.♦ 2. 3. 4. 
1. Female     
2. Native1 .180**    
3. 
Nationality2 
.124 .516***   
4. Lawyer3 .081 .061 .088  
5.Know law4 -.031 .187** .111 .389*** 
Note: ***Significant at the 1% level, **Significant at the 5% level, *Significant at the 10% level. 
♦ Numbers across the row correspond with variables down the first column:  1.=Female, 
2=Native, etc. 
¹The variable “native” is coded “1” if English was the reported native language and “0” 
otherwise. 
²This variable is coded “1” for those who listed the United States as their partial or full 
nationality, and “0” otherwise. 
³This variable is coded “1” for those who did report knowing a lawyer, and “0” otherwise. 
4This represents subjects’ self-reported assessment of their knowledge and experience with 
American law based on a 7-point scale. 
 
Most of these subjects were highly sought after by prestigious firms 
and were considering multiple competing job offers.  Without exception, 
the MBA subjects have greater educational attainment than the InnoTech 
subjects, making them less replaceable in their future jobs.  The mean 
starting salary of the class in which the majority of MBA subjects surveyed 
was approximately $84,000 per year.96  Sixty-seven percent of the MBA 
class of 2007 went into service industries, of which consulting (25.3%) and 
investment banking (17.5%) composed the greatest shares.  Not 
surprisingly, the most prestigious, high-status employers recruit these 
students every year and the students who composed this sample were no 
exception.  For these reasons, this sample was considered uniformly higher 
SES actors than the InnoTech sample. 
As part of the online survey, the MBA students were asked to respond 
to the same four vignettes as the InnoTech employees by writing their 
responses in open-ended text boxes.  They were also asked to rate their 
agreement or disagreement with the following statement, on a 5-point 
Likert-style scale: 
If I sign a contract with my employer that indicates that 
in return for being hired, I agree to waive my right to sue my 
employer in court, and instead have to resort to a process 
called “arbitration” to resolve any and all disputes that arise, 
that contract is enforceable, and I would not be allowed to go 
to court.  
                                                                                                                          
96 This figure is based on the MBA graduates from the class of 2007.  Eighty-three percent of this 
class obtained jobs in the United States.  The mean starting salary of students who worked outside of 
the United States was $81,800.  These figures are based on information obtained by the author from the 
school’s career services office. 
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The results are displayed in Figure 2.  Thirty percent of the MBA 
subjects exhibited low malleable consent because they either agreed or 
strongly agreed with the statement.  Fifty-one percent exhibited high 
malleable consent—that is, they either disagreed or strongly disagreed with 
the statement.97  This distribution was replicated in a second study 
involving 138 MBA students in which 35% exhibited low malleable 
consent and 50% exhibited high malleable consent.98 
 
Figure 2:  Malleable Consent of the MBAs (n=114) 
 
 
V.  RESEARCH FINDINGS 
A.  Malleable Consent and Socio-Economic Status 
Hypothesis 1 states that actors with greater educational attainment and 
more job alternatives that posses relatively lower dependence on their 
employers are more likely to regard the form-adhesive agreements they 
sign as unenforceable when compared to actors with lower educational 
attainment, fewer job alternatives, and greater dependence on their 
                                                                                                                          
97 Roughly nineteen percent selected option three, “Neutral or Unable to Decide.”  These 
participants were considered as exhibiting neither high nor low malleable consent. 
98 It is also worth noting that the MBA data is used to evaluate the convergent, discriminant and 
predictive validity of the construct of malleable consent.  As part of the much larger survey that 
subjects completed, many psychometric tests were administered measuring such things as emotional 
intelligence (“EQ”), Machiavellianism, positive/negative affect, self-esteem, distributive self-interest 
and the NEO-5 factor inventory. 
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employers.  In other words, InnoTech subjects are more likely to exhibit 
lower malleable consent than the MBAs.  To test this hypothesis, the mean 
malleability of consent of the InnoTech subjects is compared with that of 
the MBAs.  Table 6, depicting the statistically different mean malleable 
consent scores of the two samples, demonstrates support for this 
hypothesis.  It appears that the MBA subjects are more likely than the 
InnoTech subjects to report that an agreement they signed purporting to 
prevent them from suing their employers (resorting instead to arbitration) 
is unenforceable.  The mean MBA malleable consent score (MC) was .63 
(SD = .485) as compared with .31 (SD = .467) for the InnoTech sample 
(where MC of one is equal to the view that the agreement is unenforceable 
and MC of zero is equal to the view that it is enforceable).  
 
Table 6:  Comparison of Malleable Consent Levels Across Samples 
 
InnoTech MBAs 
Welch Test 
of Difference of 
Means 
High 31% 51%  
Low 69% 30%  Malleable Consent     
N 36 92  
    
 
Mean/std. 
dev. 
.305 
(.467) 
.630 
(.485) 
p=.000 
B.  Malleable Consent and the Transactional Versus Relational View of 
Work 
The second hypothesis is that viewing the form agreement as 
enforceable (low malleable consent) is associated with an increased 
likelihood of viewing the employment relationship as relational.  
Conversely, expressing the view that the agreement is unenforceable (high 
malleable consent) is associated with an increased likelihood of viewing 
the employment relationship as transactional.  To test this hypothesis, a 
proportional odds model for ordinal logistic regression was applied.  This 
appeared to be the most appropriately fitting model.  The p value for the 
Brant test of the proportionality assumption was .53 for the MBA sample 
and .01 for the InnoTech sample.  This means that the proportionality 
assumption is valid for the MBAs but not necessarily so for the InnoTech 
subjects.  The most likely reason for this is the relatively small InnoTech 
sample size.99  It is unlikely to be cause for concern given the construction 
of the transactional-relational scale.  Additionally, the results are robust 
                                                                                                                          
99 Rollin Brant, Assessing Proportionality in the Proportional Odds Model for Ordinal Logistic 
Regression, 46 BIOMETRICS 1171, 1173–74 (1990). 
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when ordinary least squares regression is applied.   
Tables 7 and 8 present the ordinal logistic regression results of the role 
of malleable consent in explaining subjects’ transactional-relational scale 
scores for InnoTech and MBA subjects respectively.100  The results 
demonstrate consistent support for the second hypothesis across both 
samples.  In both cases, high malleable consent corresponds negatively and 
significantly with subjects’ relational view of employment.  As an 
example, holding other variables constant at their means, there is a 26.5% 
probability that a white, male InnoTech participant of average sample age 
(twenty-three) who expressed the belief that the agreement was 
unenforceable would score a zero on the relational scale (scored as 
“transactional”).  This probability drops to 0.06% that the same individual 
would score a six on the relational scale.101 
                                                                                                                          
100 The full 6-element scale is used in these analyses.  The salient results remain significant when 
the 4-element relational scale is used as well—dropping the two coded variables that were excluded 
from the principle component analysis and factor analysis as discussed above. 
101 Interestingly, being a minority employee at InnoTech corresponds negatively with viewing the 
employment exchange relationally.  It appears that minorities are more likely to view their employment 
relationships as transactional.  This was borne out in analyzing the qualitative responses of subjects.  
Indeed, several of the minority subjects spoke “off the record,” insisting on shutting off the recorder, 
about their belief that InnoTech discriminated against them based on their race.  It is not surprising that 
such conditions, or at least the perception of such conditions, stymies relational exchange.  Also 
unsurprisingly, employees who viewed their work as a career as opposed to a job were significantly 
more likely to view the exchange relationally.  The gender of subjects did not seem to have any 
significant role in explaining transactional-relational scores of InnoTech subjects, but it was 
significantly positively correlated with expression of a relational view for MBAs.  Women in the 
InnoTech sample were no more or less likely to view their employment as more relational, but women 
in the MBA sample were significantly more likely than men to view the employment relationship as 
more relational. 
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Table 7: Ordinal Logistic Regression Results:  The Role of Malleable Consent in Explaining 
Transactional-Relational View of Work (InnoTech Subjects) 
Change in Predicted Probabilitiesa 
Indep. 
Variables 
Ordered 
Logit 
Est.b 
Transactional 
0 
1 2 3 4 5 Relational 
6 
Malleable 
Consent 
-
1.730** 
(.03) 
.26 .11 .14 -.33 -.20 -.13 -.02 
Female -8.13 
(.423) 
.12 .06 .02 -.02 -.10 -.06 -.01 
Black -1.140 
(.175) 
.17 .08 .01 -.25 -.14 -.08 -.12 
Hispanic -1.910* 
(.056) 
.33 .09 -.05 -.44 -.21 -.11 -.16 
Other -1.780* 
(.079) 
.32 .09 -.06 -.04 -.19 -.10 -.01 
Age .028 
(.716) 
-.08 -.05 -.05 .01 .09 .08 .01 
Career 2.560** 
(.008) 
-.19 -.13 -.22 -.02 .13 .34 .09 
Note: sample size=36; chi squared (df=7)=17.28; pseudo r squared=.39 
aChange in the predicted probabilities of holding each scaled valence for an increase from the minimum 
to the maximum value of each independent variable, while holding all other independent variables 
constant at their means. 
bThe top entries are ordered logit coefficients.  
P values are in parenthesis.  
***Significant at the 1%level; **Significant at the 5% level; *Significant at the 10% level 
 
 
Table 8:  Ordinal Logistic Regression Results:  The Role of Malleable Consent in Explaining 
Transactional-Relational View of Work (MBA Subjects) 
Change in Predicted Probabilitiesa 
Indep. 
Variables 
Ordered 
Logit Est.b 
Transactional 
0 
1 2 3 Relational 
4 
Malleable 
Consent 
-1.023** 
(.02) 
.01 .12 .09 -.16 -.52 
Female 1.490*** 
(.001) 
-.01 -.17 -.12 .22 .08 
Nationality .340 
(.435) 
.00 -.04 -.02 .05 .01 
Note: sample size=91; chi squared (df=3)=19.00; pseudo r squared=.21 
aChange in the predicted probabilities of holding each scaled valence for an increase from the minimum 
to the maximum value of each independent variable, while holding all other independent variables 
constant at their means. 
bThe top entries are ordered logit coefficients.  
P values are in parenthesis.  
***Significant at the 1%level; **Significant at the 5% level; *Significant at the 10% level 
 
Figure 3 is a graphical representation of the two salient quantitative 
results of this Article—it shows a comparison of the Lowess-smoothed 
mean malleable consent scores for the MBAs and InnoTech subjects by 
subjects’ transactional-relational scale scores.  The hypothesized inverse 
relationship is present in both samples (supporting the second hypothesis), 
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and the malleable consent of the MBAs remains consistently higher than 
the InnoTech subjects (supporting the first hypothesis). 
 
Figure 3:  Comparative Lowess Graphs of Mean Malleable Consent by Relational Scores Across 
Samples 
 
VI.  IMPLICATIONS 
Through their interpretations of contracts, actors instantiate their 
relationships with the state; they do so, it appears, on the basis of their 
socio-economic status, opportunities and constraints of employment, and 
power and potential to redress wrongs.  From the vantage of individual 
signers, increased exposure to form-adhesive agreements is tantamount to 
increased loss of control over contracting capacity, a classical institutional 
symbol of capitalism and economic freedom.102  As Weber noted, “the 
present day significance of contract is primarily the result of the high 
degree to which our economic system is market-oriented.”103  This loss of 
control over such an obvious icon of economic freedom begs the question 
of whether greater exposure to form-adhesive agreements has lead to 
increased social levels of malleable consent, and consequently, perhaps, 
less resort to institutional (legal) means of redress when persons’ 
experiences suggest breach of contract (which are not read or 
understood).104   
Malleable consent may be one critical indicator of how individuals 
                                                                                                                          
102 See generally PIERS BEIRNE & RICHARD QUINNEY, MARXISM AND LAW (1982). 
103 WEBER, supra note 26, at 105. 
104 See Supra note 24. 
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respond to this loss of control.  Form-adhesive agreements may be a 
necessary means of expedient dealing for modern times.  But like other 
modern “necessary” conveniences, they may nonetheless produce 
significant negative externalities.  Such phenomena need to be studied, not 
only normatively or in terms of their legality, but from a sociological 
vantage—seeking to understand their causes and effects and how these 
vary by social class. 
This Article presents very preliminary evidence to support the theory 
that occupationally advantaged actors respond to these contracts differently 
than the less advantaged, which, in turn, results in different conceptions of 
self relative to employers and the state.  By exploring these differences 
across two distinguishable groups, malleable consent is shown to be a 
useful construct for revealing otherwise unobserved differences between 
the groups’ subjective construction of law and social status, and hence 
citizenship.  It therefore seems that understanding malleable consent and 
related behaviors surrounding form-adhesive contracts may lead to further 
clarification of otherwise obscured social stratification on important 
features of citizenship—specifically, the ability to make claims against 
others or the state and the ability to mediate one’s relationships through the 
law. 
These findings might have been otherwise obfuscated, or at least more 
difficult to discern, without measuring malleable consent.  Indeed, no 
statistically significant differences were observed between InnoTech 
employees and the MBAs in terms of the rates at which subjects reported 
wanting to resort to law to redress the hypothetical wrongs—even in the 
vignettes in which they imagined being sexually harassed and losing their 
jobs because of illegal discrimination.105  Without a measure of malleable 
consent, the two groups would have appeared to have equally considered 
the law to be a viable option in their arsenal.  Research has previously 
demonstrated that power-disadvantaged actors are constrained from taking 
action to redress injustices.106  In the employment context, malleable 
consent could be thought of as a cost that the advantaged perceive as 
avoidable more often than the disadvantaged. 
This research also offers initial support for the theory that there is a 
connection between interpretations of enforceability of form-adhesive 
agreements and exchange relationships between the drafters and signers of 
                                                                                                                          
105 The numbers illustrated sixty-six percent for InnoTech and seventy-five percent for MBAs.  
This finding is consistent with prior research.  See, e.g., EWICK & SILBEY, supra note 21 (finding many 
people claim that they will resort to law if they experience denial of rights, but simultaneously describe 
how they cannot afford a lawyer to help secure their rights). 
106 See generally Ewick & Silbey, supra note 93 (examining cognitive perceptions about law held 
by subjects of authors’ study); Morris Zelditch, Jr. & Joan Butler Ford, Uncertainty, Potential Power, 
and Nondecisions, 57 SOC. PSYCH. Q. 64 (1994) (finding that existence of a power structure prevents or 
delays actors from seeking redress for inequitities).  
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such contracts.  Individuals who regard the form-adhesive agreements they 
must sign as a condition of employment (in this case, a mandatory 
arbitration agreement) as unenforceable (high malleable consent) are more 
likely to view their jobs as an instrumental transaction—as simply a market 
financial exchange, and hence less likely to give their employers the 
opportunity to resolve disputes internally.  When actors are more likely to 
regard form-adhesive agreements as enforceable (low malleable consent) 
they are more likely to interpret their employment as an exchange of 
obligations as well as rewards, imbued with a substantive, moral 
relationship, what industrial relations scholars often refer to as a “social 
contract,”107 or a “relational exchange.”  In other words, when actors view 
form-adhesive agreements as unenforceable, there is less perceived trust in 
the employment relationship, and hence in the employer’s ability to resolve 
disputes as well.  This is an important finding as it is an indication of the 
class divide so often overlooked or ignored in recent descriptions of 
American social life.  The measure of trust in the employer’s capacity to 
handle disputes and the link between this measure and citizenship therefore 
seems worthy of future discussion and research. 
Methodological limitations notwithstanding,108 these results appear to 
hold across diverse populations.  One potential implication of this specific 
preliminary finding is the connection between the overwhelming loss of 
control over contract, a symbol of a democratic, capitalistic free-market 
economic ideal, and increased resort to non-legal forms of redress when 
contracts are perceived to be breached. 
At the beginning of this Article, a feedback loop was described in 
which social constructions of law create contract, and contract in turn 
creates socially construed forms of private law, backed by the state.  There 
is a fundamental discrepancy between this subjectively driven form of 
contract and the traditional objective theory of contract.  This fundamental 
discrepancy becomes most apparent when examining form-adhesive 
agreements in which “freedom of contract” is a function of great imbalance 
of mutual dependency and “meeting of the minds” is fictional at best.  
Courts have clearly struggled with this discrepancy in deciding when to 
enforce boilerplate of varying adhesiveness and one-sidedness.  Perhaps 
malleable consent is evidence in support of the feedback loop, in which 
individual interpretation of these unique and ubiquitous contracts trickles 
up at the same time as the law on the books (demonstrated in part, by 
                                                                                                                          
107 See sources cited supra note 20. 
108 There are clear limitations, particularly when comparing across the two studies.  For instance, 
the MBAs were asked to imagine that they had agreed to terms that the InnoTech employees had 
actually signed.  As mentioned earlier, and described in more detail in the section below, this Article 
presents preliminary support for the hypotheses generated.  In spite of its limitations, this Article hopes 
to establish some preliminary comparisons in order to provoke discussion in these theoretically 
important areas. 
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courts’ and commentators’ strain to apply objective theory of contract to 
form-adhesive contracts) trickles down.109   
VII.  LIMITATIONS 
This work is intended as grounded theory based on the limited 
evidence currently available.  This Article is only a first step; the construct 
of malleable consent was born from an inductive study about exchange and 
conflict at the workplace.  It offers preliminary evidence of the construct’s 
existence and an argument for its inclusion in the panoply of ways we 
study how law emerges.  Moreover, it takes form and evolves in our 
collective conscious, along with its potential variation across structural 
constraints, social strata and individual level constructions.  The hope is to 
generate hypotheses and provoke further discussion, in part from some of 
the questions raised but not answered herein.  For instance, this Article 
does not explain when actors form beliefs about enforceability or whether 
these beliefs are mutable in the short term (for the instant transaction) or 
the long term, such that they carry over from one transaction to another. 
Other questions raised include: What effect does malleable consent 
play in negotiations, particularly in repeated transaction relationships?; 
does variation in malleable consent reveal differences in actions and 
outcomes even when actors have not signed form-adhesive agreements?; 
how does malleable consent affect litigant decision making, and how does 
the construct affect judicial decision making and legislation?  If the 
feedback loop described at the outset of this Article is valid, and the law is 
informed by norms of exchange and vice versa, laws and judicial decisions 
should accord increased levels of malleability of consent.  More research 
examining the prevalence of this theorized phenomenon is warranted.  
Four limitations of this Article exist. First, this Article offers only 
proposed hypothetical relationships and offers evidence in support of 
component parts of these relationships.  Much remains to be seen as to 
whether malleable consent carries with it the extent of negative 
repercussions it is theorized to carry. 
Second, it is unclear at what point interpretations of contract 
enforceability are formed.  This presents some difficulty for two reasons: 
one, the responses to the vignettes are measured before malleable consent; 
and two, it weakens the ability to draw comparisons across the InnoTech 
and MBA groups.  There are some obvious apples-to-oranges problems 
comparing across the two groups, a clear limitation of this research.  For 
example, the MBAs are asked about a contract they imagine signing at a 
                                                                                                                          
109 This notion was suggested to the author in a conversation with Stewart Macaulay.  Courts too, 
could be said to have some malleableness in rulings on enforceability of form-adhesive agreements.  
This Article begs the question of the extent to which individuals’ malleable consent jives with that of 
the courts, and the extent to which courts influence individuals and vice-versa. 
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future job, while the InnoTech subjects are asked about a contract they 
have actually signed as a condition of their current employment.  
Understanding when malleable consent is formed may help to account for 
the socio-economic differences described in this Article.  Future research 
measuring the construct over time could lead to useful causal findings 
indicating what experiences affect these interpretations and whether actors’ 
views of malleable consent are mutable—a measure of the malleability of 
malleableness, if you will. 
Third, this Article lacks a basis for determining the effect on actual 
behavior of being “right” or “wrong” about the enforceability of the 
agreement.  As mentioned earlier, InnoTech fully enforces the agreement 
in question, and agreements to arbitrate such as the one hypothesized in the 
MBA survey are mostly enforceable legally; most of the time that 
organizations implement such agreements, it is because they fully intend to 
use them to reduce the costs of employment litigation.  They are loath to 
make exceptions for fear of setting an undesirable precedent.  What 
happens to the MBAs with high malleable consent who attempt to sue?  Do 
they behave differently than those with low malleable consent who assume 
the worst about their employers?  How so?  How does this experience alter 
their behavior with respect to form-adhesive agreements in the future, if at 
all? 
Fourth, and unexplored in this Article, but with potentially important 
implications, is the effect of malleable consent on signing habits.  That is, 
what if malleable consent beliefs carry over from one contract area to 
another, leading one to believe that form-adhesive agreements are not 
binding when they are?  For instance, if one learns to have high malleable 
consent from interacting with credit card companies that routinely grant 
leniency on late payments, over time this person will believe that all form-
adhesive agreements, like credit card “Terms of Agreement,” are really 
unenforceable, and will become less concerned about signing forms, even 
if they contain unfair terms.  To continue the hypothetical, this person then 
signs up with a private military company like Blackwater, which similarly 
requires new hires to sign a form-adhesive agreement that purports to 
release Blackwater and all of its agents, officers and shareholders from 
“any liability whatsoever” even when death or injury is “caused in whole 
or in part by the negligence” of the company,110 the signer thinks this form 
is no different from an American Express contract, and signs without 
worry over the enforcement of the draconian provisions that may lurk 
within.  Blackwater relies on this form-adhesive agreement to prevent the 
huge number of injured and dead from suing them.111  Understanding how 
                                                                                                                          
110 Daphne Eviatar, Contract with America: Hard Terms for the Soldier of Fortune, HARPER’S 
MAGAZINE, Oct. 2007, at 74–75.  
111 Id. at 74–76.  
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malleable consent carries over across contexts, and otherwise affects 
signing habits, may contribute to a decrease in the abuse of such forms, or 
may inform policy in ways not explored before this research. 
VIII.  CONCLUSION 
Apparently, the devil is in the details.  And, it has been said that 
“[t]here are no honorable bargains involving exchange of qualitative 
merchandise like souls for quantitative merchandise like time and 
money.”112  But what happens when we do not realize that we have traded 
our souls away until it is too late?  The hope of this line of research is to 
illuminate one subtle, yet ubiquitous exchange and its effects.  This Article 
highlights the difference between law on the books (embodied by what the 
forms purport to do) and law in action (how signers experience and 
interpret the forms) and explores the gap between the two.  The point, 
however, is that this gap is a “space, not a vacuum.”113  It is not enough 
that we recognize this space, but that we seek to understand what fills it, 
and how what fills it in turn affects the law and our interpretations of 
ourselves relative to others as actors bound by laws and normative 
constraints.  Through such work, we hope to gain a better understanding of 
citizenship across socio-economic boundaries.  As has been done in other 
areas, this classic socio-legal approach may open doors to explain this 
space to inform policy and future research. 
 
 
                                                                                                                          
112 William S. Burroughs, Words of Advice for Young People, http://www.jjjwebdevelopment. 
com/306sites/burroughs/burroughs.shtml (last visited Sept. 29, 2008). 
113 Ewick & Silbey, supra note 93 at 1040. 
